

## **REPORTED ARGUMENT IN ECONOMICS TEXTBOOKS A META-PRAGMATICS OF ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE**

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**Abstract:** The paper considers the ways in which argumentative thought or discourse is reported in textbooks and studies the role played by reported argument in the specific genre. After a brief presentation of a variety of issues involved, the paper focuses on the sequences of argumentative roles realised in a corpus of economics textbooks and studies the ways in which these construct argumentative dialogue within a formally monologic text, both on the secondary discourse plan (reported discourse) and across discourse plans. The preferred patterns are shown to play a major role in realising two of the macro-functions of the specific academic genre: presenting a map of the discipline and establishing a framework for scientific communication. The variety of signals involved in reporting argument is discussed with reference to their potential for identifying argumentative roles and for directing readers' expectations.

**Keywords:** metapragmatics, dialogue, argumentative roles, reported argument, genre analysis, textbooks.

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Recent debate over the nature of textbooks has been very active in the field of language studies on academic discourse, and economics discourse in particular. Many of the studies on economics textbooks – such as Klamer (1990) or Swales (1993) – have emphasised how textbooks often hide the argumentative nature of science – economics as conversation

(McCloskey, 1985) – and how, therefore, they do not represent correctly the discursive procedures by which scientific consensus is reached. Lack of hedging and citation, scarce visibility of human agents, abstract nominalisations have been identified by many (cf. Bloor and Bloor, 1993; Henderson and Hewings, 1987 and 1990; Hewings, 1990; Mason, 1990; Swales, 1993 and 1994) as markers of “canonizing discourse” (Brown, 1993), discourse that reduces debate within the discipline to a representation of the dominant paradigm.

It is my belief, however, that a study of reported argument (of the ways in which argumentative thought or discourse is represented or projected)<sup>1</sup> may contribute to our awareness of the argumentative strategies that may be realised through it, as well as to a definition of textbooks as a genre. Reported argument may indeed be a powerful tool for developing the author's argument and for showing the novice reader a map of the *Topoi* and argumentative tools of the discipline.

This paper is part of a wider study of the features of textbooks as a genre in academic discourse and draws on a variety of approaches to genre studies (see Swales, 1990; MacDonald, 1994; Freedman and Medway, 1994; Berkenkotter and Huckin, 1995). Following Swales (1994), textbooks are not taken to represent a simple case of expert-to-expert communication. As I have shown elsewhere (Bondi, in press a), textbook writers engage in a plurality of argumentative dialogues and take up a plurality of roles: they are teachers addressing students but also teachers addressing other teachers, writers addressing their evaluators, researchers addressing other researchers, arguers addressing a partner in argument.

A major focus of my wider analysis, however, has been a paradox studied for example by Myers (1992) and Stubbs and Gerbig (1993): the very same features that seem to make textbooks easy to read may in fact leave student-readers unprepared to other forms of scientific communication. It is my belief that forms of reported argument in textbooks may indeed help the student identify the fundamentals of a discipline, its cognitive and argumentative tools, but they certainly do not help him/her to interpret features of more advanced scientific communication: citation<sup>2</sup>, for example, a key element in research articles, only plays a minor role in textbooks when compared to other forms of reported argument (Bondi, in press b).

The present paper briefly sketches a framework for the analysis of reported argument and then focuses on the ways in which reported argument builds dialogic sequences of argumentative roles (Stati 1990) both on the *primary* discourse plan (reporting discourse) and on the *secondary* discourse plan (reported discourse). An argumentative role can be defined following Stati (1990:16) as “la fonction, offensive ou défensive, que la phrase est capable d'exercer dans le mécanisme de la persuasion: preuve, rectification, conclusion, etc.” This may be distinguished from the illocutionary force of a speech act, although both functions pertain to the area of pragmalinguistics.

<sup>1</sup> The expression “reported argument” is used here to refer to all the different forms of representation of argumentative speech and thought and should thus be interpreted as a general term covering both “quotations” (direct representations) and “reports” (indirect representations). Expressions like “representation” or “projection” (Halliday, 1985) would less ambiguously refer to the general category, but they are less commonly used in the metapragmatic literature. “Projection” will be used here occasionally to refer to the textual “distancing” mechanism of attributing utterances to other textual voices.

<sup>2</sup> Citation in research articles has been widely studied with reference to many discourse areas: see for example Berkenkotter e Huckin (1994: 45-60). A framework for analysis and a brief review of the literature can also be found in Swales (1990).

The study of reported argument lies in the framework of the study of metalinguistic phenomena and pays particular attention to metapragmatics, i.e. the study of indicators of speaker's awareness of the features of language use (see Verschueren, 1995; Lucy, 1993: 11-21 and Silverstein, 1993: 33-35). The area draws together contributions from various disciplines ranging from pragmatics, to speech act theory, semiotics, linguistic anthropology etc. The definition adopted here is purposely fuzzy and does not for the moment distinguish between different degrees of self-referentiality and different objects of the metasemiosis. Our interest in reported argument, however, implies that rather than dealing with indicators of speaker's awareness of the pragmatic function of utterances in general, we will focus on indicators of argumentative roles involved in dialogic exchanges.

## 2. METHODS AND MATERIALS

The study is based on a corpus of 30 chapters taken from 10 different economics textbooks published in English.<sup>3</sup> The corpus includes 10 introductory chapters, 10 chapters on micro-economic issues, 10 chapters on macro-economic issues.

My wider study of reported argument has focused on two main areas:

- a) the pragmatic *status* of projected argument, as identified by participants, existential *status* and pragmatic functions (see Tannen 1986, 1989; Macaulay, 1987; Clark and Gerrig, 1990; Yule and Mathis, 1992; Yule 1993, about quotation of speech);
- b) argumentative roles (Stati, 1990) and their sequences, both on the primary and on the secondary discourse plan.<sup>4</sup> Particular attention has been paid to typically dialogic roles like Concession or Objection, which represent a dialogic alternation of turns and an interplay between discourses. In a formally monologic genre like the one under examination this implies paying particular attention to what Stati (1994) calls "passive moves". Stati grounds his analysis on the distinction between *active* moves "which essentially tend (a) to convince the addressee to accept (adopt, share...) a certain opinion or (b) to determine him to assume a certain behaviour" (1994: 259) and *passive* moves, which are "related to the effects of the active moves, i.e. with the process of 'being persuaded'. Such moves are Agreement, Rejection, Request for explication etc. By uttering a sentence which plays a passive role the arguer: (a) accepts or rejects the partner's argumentation, and in doing so, he proves the success or the failure of the partner's move, or (b) he expresses his wish (his availability / willingness) to be convinced by his partner" (1994: 259). Stati proposes a tentative inventory divided into two sets:
  - Passive moves: Agreement; Confirmation; Acknowledgement; Concession, Disagreement; Request for explication; Request for support; Conjecture;
  - Moves including a passive component: Antithesis; Rectification; Objection.

<sup>3</sup> See the Appendix for full references. References to examples taken from the corpus are given by surname (of first author) and chapter.

<sup>4</sup> Stati (1990) considers the following categories: a) "assentiment, confirmation, adhésion"; b) "justification, preuve"; c) "concession"; d) "rectification"; e) "objection"; f) "contestation, désaccord, dissensément"; g) "critique, accusation, reproche" (65-85).

I have further considered two major issues which play a fundamental role (a macro-role, as it were) in reporting argument. These may be identified as:

- “Voice-directionality”, the ways in which the plurality of voices involved in a text are convergent or conflicting;
- the interplay of the various roles realised in the text with the basic discursive roles of Discourse (the theses globally supported by the writer, as Proponent) and Counter-discourse (the discourse of the intended Opponent). A further macro-role I have found useful for my analysis is that of Audience as argument Evaluator, a macro-role which may be occasionally attributed to both writer and reader.<sup>5</sup>

From the point of view of the Conflict-Convergence cline,<sup>6</sup> for example, we might identify roles like Agreement, Confirmation and Acknowledgement as showing convergence, and roles like Conjecture, Request for explication and Request for support as showing co-operation or tentative convergence. Concession and Rectification would play a turning role: Concession shows only partial convergence and therefore strongly anticipates some kind of conflict, while Rectification shows only partial conflict and therefore implies some kind of convergence. Disagreement, Antithesis (or Counter-claim) and Objection would be forms of conflicting voices, where Disagreement simply expresses conflict, whereas Antithesis (or Counter-claim) expresses an alternative claim and Objection identifies reasons for invalidating the initiating claim (Stati 1994: 269-70).

From the point of view of the two discursive macro-roles of Proponent and Opponent – the Discourse / Counter-discourse distinction – a study of sequences of argumentative roles clearly points at a major problematic distinction between different levels of conflict. I have felt the need to distinguish textual relationships which manifest conflict on the surface of discourse from discursive relationships, which manifest conflict within the global, hierarchically determined structure of discourse.

In terms of surface sequences, therefore, we may identify a variety of conflicting claims and consider the initiating Claim as Claim and the reactive conflicting Claim as Counter-claim. We must notice, however, that interactions involving more than two participants may require more complex patterns, where a third Claim might perhaps be a Counter-claim to the first, but simply a Rectification of the second, etc.<sup>7</sup> This may lead us to identify them as Claim 1, Claim 2, Claim 3, leaving a description of the patterns of conflict to a further stage of analysis.

In terms of the discursive relationships that are hierarchically identified by the global structure of discourse, we will notice that the basic Discourse / Counter-discourse conflict does not coincide at all – both in an abstract description of discursive forces and in the actual structure of discourse – with the sequential pattern of Claim as initiating move and Counter-claim as conflicting responsive move. As we will see in §4.2, textbooks often open their major sequences with a Claim that turns out to be an instance of Counter-discourse, and follow that with an antithetical Counter-claim or Objection (clearly marked as such by connectors, for example) which identifies the Discourse.

<sup>5</sup> See Plantin (1996b) and his analysis of the three actantial roles of *Proposant*, *Opposant* e *Tier*.

<sup>6</sup> See Bussi (1997) for a scalar view of conflict.

<sup>7</sup> We have ignored this further stage of analysis for the purposes of the present paper.

Readers often become a “third party” (acting as Evaluators or Audience) in this *mise-en-scène* of Discourse and Counter-discourse. They are asked to identify more or less temporarily with some of the voices of the text and they are often “constructed” through presupposition of knowledge and belief, for example in evaluative or concessive moves. Writers are also occasionally involved in debates as mere evaluating Audience.

The various features listed above can be illustrated through example 1, which is perhaps a special – but not unusual – case of reported argument. The right column visualises the sequence of argumentative roles found in the text and the left column reports the extract from the text. Reporting frameworks have been underlined, while signals of argumentative roles have been highlighted in bold; both categories are thus shown to present varying degrees of explicitness.

(1) The Need for Abstraction.	Claim (DISCOURSE)
<p><u>Some students</u> find economics <b>unduly</b> abstract and “unrealistic.” The stylized world envisioned by economic theory seems only a distant cousin to the world they see around. There is an old joke about three people – a chemist, a physicist and an economist – stranded on an isolated island with an ample supply of canned food but no implements to open the cans. In debating what to do, <u>the chemist</u> <b>suggested</b> lighting a fire under the cans, <b>thus</b> expanding their contents and causing the cans to burst. <u>The physicist</u> <b>doubted</b> that this would work. <u>He advocated</u> building a catapult with which they <b>could</b> smash the cans against some nearby boulders. <u>Then they turned to the economist</u> for his <b>suggestion</b>. After a moment’s thought, <u>he announced his solution</u>: “Let’s <b>assume</b> we have a can opener.”</p>	<p>Counter-claim (COUNTER-DISCOURSE)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S1 (Claim1+ Justification)</li> <li>• S2 (Rejection) (Claim2 + Justification)</li> <li>• S1+S2 (Request for Claim)</li> <li>• S3 (premise3)</li> </ul>
<p>Economists <b>do</b> make unrealistic assumptions; you will encounter many of them in the pages that follow.</p>	<p>Concession (COUNTER-DISCOURSE)</p>
<p>But this propensity to abstract from reality <b>results from</b> the incredible complexity of the real world, <b>not from</b> any fondness economists have for sounding absurd. (Baumol, Ch 1)</p>	<p>Objection ≡ Claim (DISCOURSE) (+ Justification)</p>

Let us only briefly touch upon some of the pragmatic features of the extract, which I have analysed elsewhere.<sup>8</sup> Relevant features might be the pragmatic status of projected voices and the existential status of reported argument.

*Projected voices.* the example reports both the opinion of *some students* and a debate between three fictional characters. The students belong to the world represented by the text, but may

<sup>8</sup>See Bondi (in press b) for an analysis of the pragmatic status of reported argument based on the same corpus.

also represent a potential reader of an introductory textbook. The fictional characters represent the abstract idealisation of three disciplines and their logic: chemistry, physics and economics. The three voices do not coincide with the voice of the writer or the reader, but the identity of the economist is obviously at least potentially coincident with both, since it represents the typical member of the scientific community.

*The existential status of reported argument.* Whereas the opinion of the *students* is presented as factual, the debate is clearly presented as non-factual (a joke), although it helps the writer illustrate his own claims (Discourse) about the world of fact.

Moving on to analyse the sequences of dialogic argumentative roles involving reported argument, we may consider three perspectives: signals of argumentative roles and of projection, sequences of dialogic argumentative roles on the secondary (reported) discourse plan and sequences involving the primary (reporting) discourse plan.

*Signals of argumentative roles.* Our main interest will be in the signals used to introduce voices other than the writer's and to signal the argumentative role they play in dialogic patterns involving either the writer's voice or other textual voices. These may vary in their degrees of explicitness and in their object of the metasemiosis. Some lexicalisations of verbal or mental processes simply denote a pragmatic function (*announced*), while other lexicalisations refer to a pragmatic function that is not necessarily argumentative within the language system, but becomes so in context (*suggested / suggestion, solution*); signals like *doubted* and *advocated*, finally, explicitly refer to argumentative roles that may characterise verbal or mental processes, signalling a Rejection (*doubted*) or a Claim (*advocated*). Signals like *need* and *unduly*, on the other hand, can only be taken to be a very implicit and weak signal of the existence of a Claim and a Counter-claim, as their relation of antonymy establishes the preliminary conditions for the realisation of a Claim and a Counter-claim. Further attention will be paid – see §5.2 – to what I would like to call “macro-frameworks”, lexicalisations referring to speech events (and to potential argumentative sequences in particular) rather than to single speech acts or argumentative roles; an interesting example would be *In debating what to do*.

Similarly, when considering discourse plans, we may notice that there is room for indeterminacy. The fictional debate between the chemist, the physicist and the economist is most explicitly marked as “reported” and most explicitly belongs to a secondary discourse plan (placed in the world represented by the text, in its ideational dimension). The reported opinions of *some students* who find economics *unduly abstract*, on the other hand, only establish some kind of dialogue with the discourse of the textual *persona* of the textbook writer: a kind of argumentative dialogue that formally moves across discourse plans and pragmatically takes its dialogic meaning only in the interpersonal dimension of the text, in the way the writer entertains dialogue with a possible reader.

*Sequences of reported argumentative roles.* Focusing on reported dialogue only, we may notice that the chemist and the physicist are allowed to present both a Claim and its causal Justification (i.e. *lighting a fire under the cans and thus expanding their contents and causing the cans to burst*), while the economist is only allowed to present the premises of his argument, following a counterfactual line of reasoning which is the focus of criticism in the Counter-claim that the whole joke illustrates. The sequence of the three voices can be explained in terms of the “macro-framework” offered by the reference to *debate*, which refers to a confrontation of

conflicting views. But of course the fact that the debate is introduced as a joke and that it is thus in turn embedded in a projecting framework is essential to its interpretation.

*Sequences of argumentative roles on the primary discourse plan.* The passage starts with the statement of a Claim or Thesis (*The Need for Abstraction*), which represents the writer's Discourse. This is then immediately contrasted with an Antithesis or Counter-claim in the first paragraph (*Counter-discourse*). The Antithesis is illustrated and supported by the joke. The second paragraph consists of a Concession (signalled by emphatic *do*) followed by an Objection (introduced by *but*) on the part of the textbook writer, which really coincides with the main Claim, anticipated in the heading. The sequence thus requires a series of different responses on the part of the reader: the reader is asked to laugh at the absurdity of the economist in the joke, thus temporarily identifying with the students' Counter-claim, but also to accept the claims and reasons of the writer-economist on the primary discourse plan.

Within this general framework, the present paper now focuses on the area of argumentative roles and discusses types, sequences and signals most frequently identified in the corpus of economics textbooks, both on the primary and on the secondary discourse plan. Of course, the distinctions above only have heuristic value and must be interpreted as referring to categories that are not always mutually exclusive. It will be obvious, for example, that a consideration of the lexicalisations of reporting processes belongs to both major areas of interest identified above, i.e. pragmatic status and argumentative roles. It will also be obvious that the distinction between a primary discourse plan and a secondary discourse plan is not a clear-cut distinction and that in many cases – perhaps the most interesting cases – argumentative dialogue cuts across the two discourse plans.

### 3. SEQUENCES OF ARGUMENTATIVE ROLES: SECONDARY DISCOURSE

The occurrences of reported argument in my corpus are representative of a variety of argumentative roles, but they tend to privilege the most basic argumentative relations. Monologic sequences (involving a single voice) tend to favour the Claim↔Justification-of-claim pattern.<sup>9</sup> Reported dialogic sequences (involving more than one reported voice), on the other hand, tend to be structured by passive moves or moves with a passive component.

From the point of view of the directionality of voices, two major alternatives can be identified: the converging patterns of a Claim followed by Agreement / Acknowledgement / Conjecture, etc. and the conflicting patterns of a Claim followed by an Antithesis or an Objection, or by a Rectification.

The corpus analysed shows a decided preference for conflicting sequences of the Claim^Counter-claim type. Reported discourse privileges the representation of debates, as in the sequence of example (2):

- (2) Keynesian and monetarist economists have often differed strongly on what they expect in a typical phase 2 period. Keynesians tend to be pessimistic and to expect a severe slump in phase 2. Monetarists tend to be optimistic and to expect a relatively mild recession in

<sup>9</sup> I have used the symbol ↔ to show that the order of the elements may be reversed. The symbol ^, on the other hand, shows that the order of elements in the sequence is a relevant feature.

phase 2. The main reason for these differences lies in a disagreement over what determines the expected inflation rate. Keynesians tend to believe that people adjust their expected inflation rates quite slowly, even in the face of substantial recessionary gaps. They believe, therefore, that phase 2 tends to be quite long. Monetarists are more likely to believe that downward adjustments in the expected rate can occur quite rapidly and hence that phase 2 can often be quite short. (Lipsey, Ch. 1)

Claim and Counter-claim are perhaps the most common types of argumentative roles represented on the secondary discourse plan, typically associated with the basic structure of argument and of argumentative dialogue. Most instances of reported argument are in fact instances of reported debate and dialogic sequences are thus based on some kind of conflictual strategy.

There are of course instances in which a plurality of voices is reported showing solidarity, or convergence, as for example in a Claim^Agreement sequence. Example (3) provides a case where converging voices are juxtaposed, so that the initiating claim by George Bernard Shaw is followed by a similar responsive claim by Truman, which shows Agreement with the first claim. The accumulation of parallel Claims helps establish both a solid grounding to the Claim (as if by quantity or by authority) and a core meaning, common to all the parallel Claims. Notice, however, how both positions are contrasted with what *one could argue* and thus turn out to be examples of a Counter-discourse which is only introduced to help the writer make his own Counter-claim (Discourse):

- (3) Why Economists Sometimes Disagree. George Bernard Shaw once complained that if you took all the economists in the world and laid them end to end, they wouldn't reach a conclusion. Harry Truman begged for a "one-armed economist" because those with two arms kept saying, "On the one hand, ..." and then "on the other hand". But one could argue that economists are no worse than other professionals. Physicists disagree about the origin of the universe. Doctors disagree about treatments for heart disease. Teachers disagree about methods of teaching math. So why are economists singled out for jokes? (Dolan, Ch.1)

The corpus also shows that textbooks often build up the representation of a plurality of conflicting positions only to reach a synthesis or an evaluation. Two antithetical positions are thus introduced in triadic patterns, where the writer comes in as Proponent of a synthesis of the best features of both positions, as in example (4), where two schools of thought are introduced in the first and second paragraph and the writer's most explicit attempt to identify an intermediate position, a synthesis, is signalled in the third:

- (4) In 1776, the Scottish scholar Adam Smith published his path breaking book, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Modern economics may be dated from that historic year, which was also notable for the Declaration of Independence. Smith's message was clear. Private markets should be liberated from the tyranny of government control. In pursuit of their private interests, individual producers would make the goods that consumers want. It is not, said Smith, "from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest". There is an "invisible hand," he wrote, that causes the producer to promote the interests of society. Indeed, "by pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it".

In general, said Smith, the government should be cautious in interfering with the operations of the private market. According to Smith, the best policy is *laissez-faire* – leave it alone. Government intervention usually makes things worse. [...]

A century and a half after the appearance of Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (that is, during the Great Depression of the 1930s), John Maynard Keynes wrote his *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (also known, more simply, as the *General Theory*). In this book Keynes [...] attacked the *laissez faire* tradition of economics. The government, said Keynes, has the duty to put the unemployed back to work. Of the several ways in which this could be done, one stood out in its simplicity. By building public works, such as roads, post offices, and dams, the government could directly provide jobs, and thus provide a cure for the Depression. [...]

Thus, Smith and Keynes took apparently contradictory positions – Smith arguing for less government and Keynes for more. It is possible, of course, that each was right. Perhaps the government should do more in some respects and less in others. Economic analysis does not lead inevitably either to an activist or a passive position on the part of the government. The economist's rallying cry should not be, "Do something." Rather, it should be, "Think first". (Wonnacott, Ch.1)

Whether reported discourse is monologic or dialogic, and whether dialogue is ruled by conflict or by convergence, the sequences of roles on the secondary discourse plan can often be fully interpreted as argumentative dialogue only when the primary discourse plan is considered as well, as shown in examples 3 and 4.

Before dealing with sequences cutting across discourse plans, let me just comment on the implications of this first overview for a description of the role played by reported argument in the structure of textbooks as a genre. Examples like 1-4 can be clearly seen to carry out a variety of functions, with reference to the argumentative development of discourse and to the specific features of the genre.

From the point of view of the argumentative development of discourse in textbooks, reported argument variously contributes not only to a representation of the writer's Discourse, but also to a construction of the reader's role as a partner in argument, a partner playing a variety of roles: co-proponent, co-opponent and evaluator/audience.

From the point of view of the educational aims of the genre, reported argument contributes both to presenting a map of the discipline and to introducing the reader to appropriate ways of arguing. The steps of the reported sequences help the reader identify a few basic positions within the discourse community, its reasoning conventions and the major areas of agreement and disagreement. While recognising that these are often over-simplified representations of the debate inside the scientific community, I would like to emphasise the importance of similar forms of reported argument in initiating the readers to the field they are approaching.

#### 4. SEQUENCES OF ARGUMENTATIVE ROLES ACROSS DISCOURSE PLANS

When reporting discourse is considered as well as reported discourse, the sequences of argumentative roles that emerge are representative of a wide variety of roles. The most interesting patterns are once again those that involve – besides the basic roles of Claim and

Justification – passive moves like Agreement and Concession or moves including a passive component like Antithesis, Rectification, Objection.

Dialogue across discourse plans, however, implies a major consideration of the relationship the various reported voices entertain reciprocally and with the writer's own argumentative position. As I have already anticipated, the textual notions of initiating Claim and reactive Counter-claim, within this perspective, may not coincide at all with the discursive roles of Discourse and Counter-discourse. Discursive macro-roles like Discourse and Counter-discourse, however, become dominant, so that when identifying patterns of convergence and conflict across discourse plans we will privilege the notions of Discourse and Counter-discourse.

Once again two major areas can be identified, following the basic distinction between the roles of converging voices, i.e. discourse supporting the writer's discourse, and conflicting voices, i.e. representation of a counter-discourse.

#### *4.1. Discourse: Converging voices*

The writer may use other voices to construct his/her own Discourse. The use of multiple converging voices in constructing argumentative discourse is mostly based on two types of sequences: Claim<sup>^</sup>Agreement and Claim↔Justification. Reported argument can then support the writer's claim in forms similar to arguments by authority (cf. Plantin 1996: 88-93).

The first pair – Claim<sup>^</sup>Agreement – can be realised by means of two basic attributions of roles: the writer's voice presents the Claim and a reported voice shows agreement or, alternatively, the Claim is reported and the writer provides Agreement. The alternatives may be represented as follows:

$\text{Claim}_W \wedge \text{Agreement}_R$  /  $\text{Claim}_R \wedge \text{Agreement}_W$

The first pattern is exemplified in (5), which concludes a lengthy list of an economist's "tools of the trade". The final quotation from Keynes works both as a concluding summative statement and as a climactic argument by authority.

(5) Mathematical reasoning is used extensively in economics, but so is historical study. And neither looks quite the same as when practiced by a mathematician or a historian. Statistical inference, too, plays an important role in economic inquiry; but economists have had to modify standard statistical procedures to fit the kinds of data they deal with. In 1926, John Maynard Keynes, the great British economist, summed up the many faces of economic inquiry in a statement that still rings true today:

"The master-economist must understand symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the particular in terms of the general and touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought. He must study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of the future. No part of man's nature or his institutions must lie entirely outside his regard. He must be purposeful and disinterested in a simultaneous mood; as aloof and incorruptible as an artist, yet sometimes as near the earth as a politician."

The alternative pattern can be seen in (6) below:

- (6) A person "can stare stupidly at phenomena; but in the absence of imagination they will not connect themselves together in any rational way." These words of the renowned American philosopher-scientist C. S. Peirce succinctly express the crucial role of theory in scientific inquiry and help explain why economists are so enamored of it. To the economist or the natural scientist, the word theory does not mean what it does in common parlance. In scientific usage, a theory is not an untested assertion of alleged fact. The statement that saccharine causes cancer is not a theory, it is a hypothesis, which will either prove to be true or false after the right sorts of experiments have been completed. (Baumol, Ch.1)

The sequence Claim↔Justification can be easily identified as the most frequent, although the patterns of converging voices are often interrelated. The sequence can again result into two basic attributions of roles: (a) the writer's voice presents the Claim and the Justification is reported; (b) the Claim is reported and the writer provides the Justification:

Claim<sub>W</sub>↔Justification<sub>R</sub> / Claim<sub>R</sub>↔Justification<sub>W</sub>

The chapters in my corpus present a clear preference for attributing the Claim to other voices, while providing the Justification through the voice of the textbook writers themselves. See for example how in (7) Smith's theory is presented in his own words (projected on a secondary discourse plan), whereas supporting examples and arguments are presented on the primary discourse plan, in a kind of dialogue that is clearly presented as writer-reader dialogue. Notice, however, that the initial adhesion to Smith's theory is gradually turned into a Rectification, or – better – a Rectification is anticipated in the third paragraph:

- (7) *The Invisible Hand.* Markets in which governments do not intervene are called free markets. Individuals in free markets pursue their own interests, trying to do as well for themselves as they can without any government assistance or interference. The idea that such a system could solve the what, how, and for whom problems is one of the oldest themes in economics, dating back to Adam Smith, the famous Scottish philosopher-economist, whose book *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) remains a classic. Smith argued that individuals pursuing their self-interest would be led 'as by an invisible hand' to do things that are in the interests of society as a whole.

Suppose you wish to become a millionaire, or play around with new ideas and invent a new good, perhaps the television, the motor car or the hand calculator. Although motivated by your own self-interest, you make society better off by creating new jobs and opportunities. You have moved society's production possibility frontier outwards – the same resources now make more or better goods – and become a millionaire in the process. Smith argued that the pursuit of self-interest, without any central direction, could produce a coherent society making sensible allocative decisions.

This remarkable insight has been studied at length by modern economists. In later chapters, we discuss in greater detail the circumstances in which the invisible hand works well. We also show that there are circumstances in which it does not lead society to allocate resources efficiently. Some government intervention may then be justified. (Begg, Ch. 1)

#### 4.2. Counter-discourse: conflicting voices

Reported argument more often dramatises the voice of an opponent, thus representing Counter-discourse. The Claim (or Counter-claim) representing Counter-discourse is thus often refuted or rectified by the writer so as to lead the reader to the thesis (Discourse) supported by the writer. Argumentative discourse thus embeds its own counter-discourse so as to show its weaknesses and make it accessible to refutation.

In terms of Discourse and Counter-discourse, this is certainly a dominant pattern. Even if the writer's Discourse is often anticipated in some way, the opening scenes of many episodes of argumentative dialogue involving forms of projection are dominated by Counter-discourse. The writer often seems to ask the reader to identify with Counter-discourse first, only to be led to accept the Discourse through sequences of Concessions, Rectifications, Objections, etc. In many instances, however, the writer's Discourse is anticipated in subtle ways, before being more fully elaborated after the Counter-Discourse.

One of the most frequent patterns is the pattern represented in the global context of example 1, involving Concession as a turning point between Counter-discourse and Discourse. The imaginary debate represented in the joke is part of a wider pattern where it functions as an illustration of the position that takes up the role of Counter-discourse, in a sequence of the following kind, where Claim (as implicitly expressed in the section heading) and Counter-claim coincide with Discourse (D) and Counter-discourse (C-D):

Claim[=D]^Counter-claim[=C-D]^Concession^Objection [=Claim].

A variation on the sequence can be seen in example (8), which again involves Concession as a turning point. The opening series of questions which might act as an initiating Claim certainly identifies an instance of Counter-discourse. If we then pay attention to the fact that this kind of rhetorical question is in itself, from the point of view of argumentative roles, typically a Counter-claim, in that it contrasts an accepted implied view, we may think of a sequence with an initiating Counter-claim (=Counter-discourse) in the first paragraph, followed by Concession (signalled by *of course*) and Objection (=Discourse) (signalled by *but*) in the second paragraph. It will also be interesting to notice that in this example the Counter-discourse is projected directly through the voice of a potential reader (*you might wonder*):

- (8) How, you might wonder, could Smith or Keynes or today's economists hope to answer the deep and difficult questions that economics addresses? How could anyone hope to know in a precise and scientific way why Japan has grown rapidly while the Soviet Union has stagnated? Can economists really explain why some people are fabulously rich while others can hardly afford one square meal a day?

Of course, economists have no monopoly on the truth about the important issues of the day. Indeed, many phenomena are poorly understood and highly controversial. But economists and other scientists have developed techniques – sometimes called the scientific approach – that give them a head start in understanding the complex forces that affect economic growth, prices and wages, income distribution, and foreign trade. (Samuelson 1992: Ch. 1)

Example 9, on the other hand, provides a further example of the problems involved in multi-voiced interactions and of the variety of combinations offered by the interplay of conflicting

voices. In this example, the voice of the writer presents itself as conflicting (as signalled by *in fact*) with the voice of a “character” represented in the text (Claim 2), whose voice in turn conflicts with *a storm of complaints* (an implicit Claim 1). This once again draws attention to the fact that Claims and Counter-claims are never as such in themselves, but only relationally and that within the same sequence they can play varying roles. Such an awareness might lead us to adopt a further convention in the representation of Claims and Counter-claims, identifying not only their relation to Discourse and Counter-discourse, but to the other claims in the sequence. The writer’s statement introduced by *in fact* would thus sequentially be a Counter-claim to Claim 2, but still represent Discourse. My objective here, however, is certainly not that of providing an adequate formal representation of sequences, capable of representing the multiple patterns of interaction, but rather to highlight the complexity of features involved, and this is not always best done by increasing the complexity of the representations.

- (9) Say the federal government wants to drill for oil off the California coast. A storm of complaints is heard. A defender of the program states, "What's all the ruckus about? There's valuable oil out there, and there is plenty of sea-water to go around. This is very low-cost oil for the nation".

In fact, the opportunity cost might be very high. If drilling leads to oil spills that spoil the beaches, recreational activities might suffer. The opportunity cost might not be easily measured, but the recreational value of the ocean is every bit as real as the value of oil under the waters. (Samuelson, Ch. 8)

A further observation I would like to make about the variety of patterns in argumentative dialogue across discourse plans is that there are forms of dialogue that are very difficult to classify as sequences. The pragmatic implications of zero-quotatives (Mathis and Yule, 1994: 69-74), for example, may actually construct forms of implicit dialogue across discourse plans. As noted also by Yule (1993: 240), quotations with no explicit signal of reporting often dramatise the (mostly critical) attitudes of the speaker/writer and imply that these attitudes are supposed to be shared by the listener/reader. Notice for example how the use of zero-quotatives creates a complex pattern of convergence and conflict in example 10, turning a reported sequence – which could otherwise be identified as purely reported argument – into a passage that still lets the primary discourse plan come through.

- (10) "We must get control of the budget monster, get control of our economy and, I assure you, get control of our lives and destinies." So said Ronald Reagan in March 1981, shortly after he was inaugurated President of the United States. But Reagan did not manage to gain control over the budget. By the 1984 election, the federal deficit was approaching \$200 billion and economic policy had become a major election issue.

Reagan's 1984 opponent, Walter Mondale, stated his position on the budget issue early in the campaign. Reagan had cut taxes too far and spent too much, especially on the military. Mondale pledged that if elected he would raise taxes, restrain the growth of military spending, and restore some of Reagan's cuts in social programs.

Candidate Reagan remained coy about his economic policy plans for a second term. Would he raise taxes? No. Would he cut spending? Of course – but at the same time military spending and social security, the largest budget items, were placed off limits for cuts. (Dolan Lindsay, Ch. 11)

Introduced as an example of the importance of an economic understanding of fiscal policy in presidential elections, the sequence turns out to be for us an example of the difficulty of establishing neat sequences of voices, turns and plans. Reagan's hypocrisy – ironically classified as coyness – is dramatised in his automatically providing the expected answer, independent of contradiction. The critical evaluation of his answers expressed by the choice of zero-quotatives is a mark of the writer's taking sides in the debate and realises the writer's conflictual attitude towards a reported sequence, as well as reader-writer expected convergence in the evaluation. As I have noticed elsewhere (Bondi, in press b), this evaluative element is often realised in textbooks by quotation of constructed oral discourse, whether accompanied by a reporting framework (as in example 9) or by zero-quotative (as in 10).

The difference between this kind of writer/reader's intervention and an explicit attribution of argumentative roles (of Objection, for example) might be related to the distinction between the active macro-roles of Proponent and Opponent and the "passive" macro-role of "Tiers" (Plantin 1996 b), of the Evaluating Audience of the argumentative debate represented, expressing agreement and disagreement without anticipating any other kind of dialogic move.

The evaluation of argument thus becomes a major element in the representation of argumentative dialogue, as we will see again when talking about evaluative macro-frameworks in § 5.2. The most common and generally accepted interpretation of argumentative dialogue is certainly that of a dialogue based on the macro-roles of Proponent and Opponent. The evaluative element, however, whether realised explicitly or in subtle and implicit forms, certainly plays a major role in the kind of dialogue that the reader and the writer may construct *around* arguments, when taking up this role of Audience/Evaluator. As we will see when considering signals, an evaluative element may be combined with the reporting of argument.

I would like to conclude this section by highlighting that, when considering how reported argument can be involved in dialogue across discourse plans, the variety of functions played by reported argument becomes even clearer. Reported argument plays a major role in constructing the writer's Discourse, particularly in sequences where reported discourse is there to represent Counter-discourse. From the point of view of the generic structure of textbooks, reported argument further contributes to presenting a map of the disciplines, with its key-issues and key argumentative procedures, but above all it helps the textbook writer to establish rules and criteria for a productive dialogue with the reader. The text constructs its reader's knowledge and beliefs through explicit attribution of a voice, through identifying a common ground in concessive patterns or in argument-evaluative elements, thus providing the reader with *Topoi* and techniques for arguing within the scientific community he/she is going to join.

## 5. REPORTED ARGUMENT AND SIGNALS OF ARGUMENTATIVE ROLES

Among the signals of argumentative roles involved in dialogic sequences, a major role can be attributed to lexicalisations of discursive and argumentative procedures in general, when they are used to introduce argumentative thought or discourse. This is obviously an extremely wide and varied lexical area, linked to metatextual and metadiscursive expressions in general (see for example Kiefer and Verschueren, 1989 and Verschueren, 1989) and to the important role they play in scientific discourse.

Of course the variety of signals involved cannot be tackled within the scope of this paper. This section simply pays attention to signals used in constructing dialogue through reported argument, for the key role they play in offering the reader a representation of scientific dialogue and in establishing an area of shared knowledge and beliefs with the reader. We then focus on two types of signals that may extend to sequences of roles acting as preliminary or evaluative macro-frameworks.

Notice, by way of preamble, that it isn't always easy to distinguish signals of argument projection from signals of argument evaluation, the reporting framework from the evaluative framework of reported argument. Some lexical elements seem to realise a modal as well as a reporting meaning, by expressing different degrees of adhesion to what is reported on the part of the reporter: just think of the difference between *Keynes showed* and *Keynes claimed*. Neutral lexicalisations, on the other hand, can be associated with explicit evaluative frameworks, so that the two meanings – the reporting and the evaluation of the reported – are separately lexicalised, as with modal adverbs, such as *correctly* in a statement like *Monetarists argued, correctly, that...*

### 5.1. *The representation of scientific dialogue: lexical and structural signals*

Metaargumentative lexicalisations cannot be limited to explicit references to argumentative roles (*Smith claimed, those in the Phelps-Friedman school argue, we may prove this...*). Lexical elements with no explicitly argumentative meaning can indeed be used to introduce argumentative discourse: *some economists say..., other economists believe...* The various lexicalisations may allow for different degrees of distinction between two main areas of metasemiosis: reference to pragmatic function and reference to argumentative role (see Stati 1990 for the distinction). An expression like *the reason suggested*, for example, refers to both pragmatic function (*suggested*) and argumentative role (*reason*). The combination of various lexical elements allows for the creation of clusters of metapragmatic elements.

The range of metaargumentative lexical elements found in the corpus cuts across the categories variously proposed for a classification of reporting frameworks.<sup>10</sup> The variety of lexicalisations used is noticeable.<sup>11</sup> I will just refer to the fact that – studying the concordances of 452 occurrences of *economist(s)* – I have found 123 cases in which this lexical element acts as subject of argumentative reporting. Here is a list of the reporting expressions:

*accept, advocate, agree, answer, announce, argue, arrive at the conclusion, ask, assume, be champions, believe, caution, conclude, consider, debate, differ, disagree, discover, discuss, dispute, not deny, employ (concepts), examine, expect, explain, favor, not ignore, insist, know, judge, learn, maintain, make assumptions / generalisations / prescriptions / statements / proposals, predict, present a united front, prescribe, presume, pronounce, quarrel, react, recommend, say, see, share a determination, show, speak, state, strive, suggest, sum up, take the view, think, understand.*

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, the classification suggested by Caldas-Coulthard (1994). The most frequent categories are certainly *speech reporting verbs* (*neutral structuring, metapropositional, metalinguistic*), but occasionally *descriptive verbs* (like *cry*) and *transcript verbs* (like *continue*) can be found.

<sup>11</sup> Swales (1990: 151) highlights a variety of available tools and refers to about 50 possible candidates.

These of course do not represent the whole variety of expressions used to report argument, but simply represent the most explicit forms of a very important area of the reporting expressions used in textbooks: the lexicalisations of the discursive activity of the scientific community to which these textbooks introduce the students. A few additions can be made to the list when considering passive formulations like *it is arguable...*, *it is commonly asserted...*, *at one time it was thought...*, which may be intuitively referred to economists in general. This would therefore suggest adding the following: *estimate, recognize, assert, hope, observe, suppose...*

These, of course, are only verbal lexicalisations of the reporting process. Reporting expressions, however, may also include purely nominal lexicalisations which would never appear in a concordance list because they do not necessarily require a “reporter” in the immediate context. We should thus add to the list the variety of nominal expressions that may be used co-textually for anaphoric or cataphoric reference, such as *the main reason for these differences, in the debate, the issue is, the idea...* These nominal expressions may at times establish long sequences of references to acts of projection.

Some lexicalisations may be extremely explicit and direct, as in the following example, where expressions such as *according to one argument, a counter-argument is, according to this argument*, clearly introduce reported argument through explicit signals of argumentative roles, and therefore act as both reporting frameworks and signals of argumentative role:

(11) Individual members of society are bound to have differing and often conflicting views about what is equitable. For instance, what is a fair distribution of wealth and income? How do we judge whether a monopolist is or is not acting in the public interest? Economists have shown increased interest in such questions of equity over the last fifty years. According to one argument, economists are able to give expert advice on issues related to economic efficiency, but equity considerations are outside the purview of economics and should be left to philosophers, politicians and social reformers.

A counter-argument is that the economist is as good a judge as anyone else in society and by the very nature of his role cannot neglect equity considerations. Balanced, expert advice involves appraising the system of production and consumption on the grounds of both efficiency and equity.

According to this argument, equity considerations are important **because** every policy action, like building a road or raising a tariff, makes some people better off and others worse off. (Hardwick, Ch. 1)

*According to* itself, which is clearly a signal of argumentative projection, combines in the corpus with a wide variety of lexicalisations that characterise scientific dialogue. Considering the 51 occurrences of the expression in my corpus, I have found 36 introducing some element of projection (rather than distribution); these realise both forms of self-projection and other-projection through a wide range of nominalisations referring to features of argument. Here is a list of potential sources of argumentative speech or thought:

*approach (2), argument (3), balance sheet, CBo, concept, critics, data, definition, deflator, figure, formula(2), function, guideposts, hypothesis (2), line of argument, logic, model, MVPLo, Phelps and Friedman, principles, projections, rule(2), Smith, survey, theory(3), tradition and custom, values, view.*

As can be easily seen, these could further be divided into a very limited set of human sources (*critics, Smith, Phelps and Friedman*) and a wide range of theoretical constructs (*approach, data, hypothesis, principles, theory, view, tradition and custom, etc.*) and discursive constructs at different levels of specificity, ranging from textual genres (*balance sheet, projections, survey*), to textual units (*definition*). The list also reflects the major role played by formalisation of rules and indicators at the level of both theoretical and discursive constructs (*CBo, deflator, figure, formula, function, MVPLo*).

This could by no means be an exhaustive analysis of the key-words covering the area of argumentative dialogue in my corpus. It is rather a series of observations on the variety of elements involved, really meant to call for more detailed comparative analyses of these lexical areas across disciplines and across genres.<sup>12</sup>

As we have seen, however, many expressions, though clearly argumentative in context, may be classified as indirect signals of argumentative projection, in that they simply refer to an element of potential projection or to a general pragmatic function, as a potential signal of a variety of argumentative roles. This was the case with lexicalisations like *wonder* in example (3) or *suggested, doubted, advocated, suggestion* and *solution* in example (1).

Notice, lastly, that some roles are not necessarily realised only through a lexicalisation of projection, but may require a combination of the signals commonly used to refer to argumentative properties of (or relations between) utterances.<sup>13</sup> In a Claim↔Counter-claim relation, for example, lexicalisations referring to projection in general normally combine with explicit contrastive connectors or with lexical elements carrying elements of antonymy and often present a high degree of structural parallelism. Structural signals like parallelism – showing perhaps the lowest degree of explicitness but highlighting points of divergence – often carry a very important weight, as shown in examples 2 and 4.

### 5.2. Macro-frameworks: establishing the premises and evaluating argument

The most important types of signals in the field of reported argument are those that allow for potential reference to complex sequences of argumentative roles and therefore act as “macro-frameworks” for longer stretches of reported argument or of argumentative dialogue across discourse plans.

In the field of projecting lexicalisations, we should first of all pay particular attention to those expressions that allow for reference to discourse events, rather than acts. These may act as *preliminary macro-frameworks* for longer stretches of reported argument, as when the reporting of a debate is introduced by a formula like *in the policy debates of the past half century...*

Preliminary macro-frameworks – whose textual function is clearly one of anticipation for the reader – identify the preparatory conditions for argument and for a variety of argumentative

<sup>12</sup> See Stubbs (1996) for a discussion of methodological problems in the identification of cultural key-words.

<sup>13</sup> See Stati (in press) for a classification of lexical signals. He identifies some major areas: connectors, meta-argumentative expressions (identified with argumentative metadiscursive signals), argumentative “auxiliaries” (epistemic modifiers, inferability indicators and para-argumentative expressions), reporting expressions (argumentative metatextual signals).

roles, by introducing a plurality of voices – a necessary pre-condition of argument. These macro-frameworks draw attention to this multiple structure, thus warning readers they may find a variety of opinions in the text, both on the primary and on the secondary discourse plan. See for instance example (11) above, where different interpretations of the notion of “equity” are introduced by a preliminary macro-framework: *Individual members of society are bound to have differing and often conflicting views about what is equitable...*

Preliminary macro-frameworks are often associated with what we might call *evaluative macro-frameworks*, explicit signals of dialogue across discourse plans. Under this heading we might consider all those signals expressing the writer’s positive or negative evaluation of the argument reported, with different degrees of conflict or convergence.

See, for example, the following passage. After introducing the topic by defining it as *highly controversial* – a preliminary macro-framework, to be followed by more explicit signals of reporting – the passage exemplifies an interesting use of evaluative macro-frameworks (underlined). Expressions like *That is the argument and there may be something to it* or *There is undoubtedly some merit to this argument* clearly introduce an explicit element of evaluation of the argumentative sequences reported (with signals marked in bold). These evaluative elements again – by showing complex evaluation of the argument under consideration – act as signals of potential argumentative sequences, more explicitly involving the writer in the argument, perhaps highlighting a role of Audience rather than Opponent or Proponent.

(12) The scope of the government’s role in the modern economy is highly controversial. With government in the United States taking nearly a third of income in taxes, and with governments in other countries going even above the 50 percent mark, many people argue that government interferes with the efficient working of the economy.

The argument is that the taxes that the government levies and the transfers it makes reduce incentives to work. If 50 cents of every dollar we earn goes to the government, then often we prefer to go to the beach rather than work another hour. With taxes so high, it’s just not worthwhile working hard. That is the argument, and there may be something to it. But there is another possibility. It may be that people work harder when the government increases taxes so that they can make up some of the income lost as a result of the taxes. Whether, on balance, taxes cause people to work more or less and by how much remain matters for ongoing study by economists, as we shall see later in the book. Similar arguments are made about the effects of government transfer programs, including unemployment benefits, on incentives to work. People on welfare might make almost as much for doing nothing as they could by working. Therefore, it is argued, government transfer programs reduce the amount that people want to work. There is undoubtedly some merit to this argument, and we shall have to see whether it is an issue of alarming proportions. (Fischer, Ch. 1)

Notice that it is probably – again – the varying degree of an element of “conflict” in the writer’s evaluation of argument (similar to forms of disagreement or partial concession) that provides these moves with their potential for encapsulating longer sequences of argumentative dialogue. The different implications in terms of the reader’s expectations or anticipatory function of the framework may be attributed to the role of convergence and conflict as preferred and dispreferred strategies. An unconditional agreement with reported argument, for example, would normally create much weaker expectations of further argumentative sequences, though clearly still acting as an evaluative framework to reported argument.

Agreement may be thus taken as the preferred turn, and is therefore often left implicit (or it is at least often interpreted as such in the absence of an evaluative framework). Explicit signals of evaluation become necessary when reporting more than one claim about a discourse topic. These may range from full agreement (as shown by *correctly* above) to more complex attitudes, where the possibility of different degrees of "conflict" is accepted. These more complex attitudes – somewhat like dispreferred turns in conversation – encapsulate argumentative sequences and create an expectation for further argument.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

The study of my corpus has only partially confirmed the thesis supported by many that textbooks do not take articulate positions about the arguments they report. Looking at the wider context, I have noticed that this may often seem so because the sequences of roles built on the secondary discourse plan can hardly be separated from those on the primary discourse plan. The discourse of the textbook writer is often juxtaposed to reported argument in a sort of "montage", where different communicative events are turned into a constructed debate.

The study has also shown that reported argument serves two important macro-functions of textbooks:

- (a) it presents a map of the discipline, with its key tenets, problem areas, general premises and methodological tools;
- (b) it constructs its reader, by establishing argumentative *Topoi* and strategies, as well as background knowledge and beliefs, e.g. through concessive and evaluative moves.

Reported argument turns out to be an important feature of textbooks as a genre within the framework of scientific discourse. Whereas citations in research articles seem to contribute above all to identifying a territory and to showing where the research presented is situated (cf. Berkenkotter and Huckin, 1994: 47), reported argument in textbooks characterises the text as a tool for access to a scientific community and realises the "mediating" function that characterises textbooks.

Reported argument allows the writer first of all to introduce a very selective map of the discipline in historical and epistemological terms. The frequency of references to Smith and Keynes helps the reader identify the milestones of economic thought. The numerous references to reported discourse that are introduced as illustrative of various lines of argument and various models help the reader identify the tenets of economic methodology. Reported argument may thus offer a representation of the discipline through the range of problems that it tackles, its problem areas, the origin of problems, its basic assumptions and its methodological procedures.

But reported argument also helps the textbook writer establish rules and criteria for a productive dialogue with the reader-student. The text constructs its readers, providing them with *Topoi* and techniques for arguing. The readers are not only offered preliminary definitions, they are also constructed through the kinds of knowledge and belief that are attributed to them, for example in concessive moves. Reported argument thus plays a key role in the "gate-keeping" function of textbooks, which is particularly foregrounded in introductory chapters. These establish the premises for the reader's possibility to join a scientific community, with a scientific methodology which is above all an argumentative methodology.

Reported argument thus contributes to establish a dialogue that is also educational: the expert-writer constructs the specific communicative competence of the student-reader. While presenting fundamental notions and preliminary definitions, textbook writers construct their pedagogic subject, by establishing communication rules, constructing the reader's identity as an economist through explicit information about how economists argue, how they establish their knowledge.

A closer linguistic scrutiny of the language resources that realise these forms of representation is essential both to a description of the genre within the specific academic discourse and to a definition of the competences required of members of the scientific community in order to produce and to interpret the various forms of disciplinary discourse.

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