A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO THE PRAGMATIC COMPONENTS OF LANGUAGE

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Abstract : Communication is interpreted here as a universal means of organising human activity, the Principle of Pragmatic Sufficiency being its basic principle. This postulate allows to establish the units with predominant pragmatic function and deduce the parameters for calculating their illocutionary values. The largest unit of the pragmatic sphere is an event of communication (a dialogue). Its ICs are communicative parts, which in its turn fall into utterances. The illocutionary features of these units are deduced from the possible aims of the partners that are presented as a matrix binding the changeable features.

Keywords : Pragmatics, Principle of Pragmatic Sufficiency, Event of Communication, Communicative Part, Participant of Communication, Matrix of the Participant.

1. INTRODUCTION

Language is universally known as a means of communication. Being a means it obeys the aim for which it is designed. Thus if we want to understand its operation and the structure of its components we should start with the questions: "What do people need Language for?" or "What do people make with its help?"

If we answer that Language helps us to exchange ideas, information or emotions we simply reformulate the initial statement, that Language is a means of communication.

To find the purpose of Language we have to define the purpose of communication itself. This purpose must be of vital necessity, such necessity that makes us use it whether we like it or

not. This must be a necessity without which our activity would be impossible. The nature of human activity makes communication necessary. Since human activity is social in its essence, it compels people to co-operate. It means that communication is the only means of providing this co-operation by organising and co-ordinating our activities.

Thus we can state that Language is a universal means of organising human activity. If we accept this assumption we come to two important conclusions.

1. Language must meet the requirements of the basic principle of organising, the Principle of Pragmatic Sufficiency which for Language can be formulated in the following way: "We say what we believe is necessary and enough, and meets the requirements of present conditions of activity". This Principle makes variability of language units an obligatory feature of all languages (Bogushevich, 1985) and provides conditions for existence of the triad (langue, parole, langage) first introduced by F. de Saussure. (Saussure, 1977).

2. The largest linguistic structure should be the one which is used to organise interpersonal activity, that is, an event of communication.

An event of communication should be a frame into which all other units of a language must be fitted. The frame itself should be constructed in accordance with the Principle of Pragmatic Sufficiency. It means that the frame should necessarily have relations to other frames, to a certain state of things, that should be changed (organised), as well as to the participants of the event of communication. Besides, its form should meet the requirement of the situation in the current activity (be enough to organise it). We can see then that the Principle of Pragmatic Sufficiency demands that any event of communication should possess all properties of a linguistic sign as it was defined by C.W.Morris (1971). The conclusion is that events of communication must be treated as linguistic units and be subjected to all general regulations for linguistic units, that is, they should be constructed with IC's, be elements of paradigms and have positional variants.

The IC's of a unit are elements that find their functions within larger units whose functions are determined by the function of the larger unit. Since the function of events of communication is to organise, its IC's should perform the function of influence. This leads us to conclude that IC's of events of communication must be those by which the participants exert their influence upon each other. Such units are series of utterances of each of the communicant. We name such series "communicative parts". The latter perform their function through informative units, utterances, which in this paper are named "speech acts", following Austin's definition. (Austin, 1962).

Thus we find the following upper units of the Language system: 1) event of communication; 2) communicative part; 3) speech act.

2. EVENT OF COMMUNICATION.

Analysing the case frame of the predicate "communicate" I.P.Susov concludes that it is necessary to include in the frame a special social argument that must indicate "in which social and interpersonal relationships" (Susov, 1986, 6) communication takes place.

A more detailed analysis of the social component shows that it should be divided into two elements: the social context (relationships of the event and the interests of the society) and role structure of the event of communication (it defines the number and quality of the communicative parts).

These features permit to classify events into those which have or have not the "third party", that is those who do not take part in the event but can be influenced by it or can watch whether the event is correct or not (cf. Pocheptsov, 1984), and into those which have or have not limited number and fixed quality of participants.

These features can be used to classify all events into two dichotomic classes. Co-ordination of these dichotomies produces three main classes of events.

2.1. Closed communication.

This type embraces events in which the number of participants is limited and the qualities of the communicative parts are fixed and distributed among the participants. The "third party" (society) is excluded and external influence is considered as interference or eavesdropping. The latter seems to be very important because sometimes we specially organise privacy:

"... Michael went out, found Soames on the weighing machine.
"I don't vary,' he said, looking up. 'How's Fleur?"
'Very well, thank you, sir.' ...
'Come in here, sir,' said Michael, entering a small room".
(Galsworthy, 1953: 181)

The privacy of the events of this type is determined not by the contents of the communication but by the very fact that they are private, that is the society is thought to have nothing to do with them.

Privacy here does not mean secrecy. Events of secret communication can occur not only in the closed, but also in the open limited class (see below), in case the information of social interest is made secret.

Thus we can name this class of communication "private" (because it is not hidden from the society, society is simply ruled out).

The private character of closed communication is the reason of its exclusively limited nature, because at least in European based cultures the events of private communication always have a predetermined, fixed number and quality of communicative parts.

2.2. Open and Limited Communication

The events of this type of communication have a fixed number and quality of communicative parts. But different from the previous type the events are thought to be of public interest and thus the "third party" is presupposed, though its members cannot

(normally) take part in the event. There interference is usually classified as hampering the procedure. Such interference as a rule elicits a negative reaction:

"Richard: ... Now then, Lawyer Hawkins, business, business. Get on with the will, man.
Titus: Do not let yourself be ordered or hurried, Mr.Hawkins.
Hawkins: Mr. Dudgeon means no offence, I feel sure".
(Shaw, 1977: 61)
This type of communication can be termed "public", because it can (and sometimes has to) be carried in public.

2.3. Open Unlimited Communication

The events of this kind are designed so that they could involve all members of the society. At least they are framed so that the possibility may (and sometimes must) become reality:

When the beasts had taken their places ... King Gugu rose ...
"Brothers," he said in his deep voice, "...Will you listen to what he has to say to you - to the message he has brought from the sky?"
"Let him speak!" came in a great roar from great company of assembled beasts. ...
Gugu the King now stepped forward.
"You have heard the stranger speak," said he, "and now you must answer him. It is for you to decide. Shall we agree to his plan or not?"
"Yes!" shouted some of the animals.
"No!" shouted others.
And some were yet silent.
Gugu looked around the great circle.
"Take more time to think," he suggested. "Your answer is very important. ... Think carefully, and when you are ready to answer, I will hear you."
Then arouse a great confusion of sounds as all the animals began talking to their fellows.
(Baum, 1986: 298-301)

This event illustrates a very special kind of events of this sort, a poll. Usually, open unlimited events do not envisage immediate response. This type can be called "societal", because it is designed to appeal to the society as a whole.

To conclude this short survey of the types of communication we are to make several remarks. First, the differences among the types are socially, that is extralinguistically predetermined. In fact it follows from the Principle of Pragmatic Sufficiency ("meet the requirements of present conditions of the activity").

Second, the Principle of Pragmatic Sufficiency predicts that the events of communication must have variants (or in other words etic and emic levels). This fact is temporally overlooked. The classification presented here makes use only of the features of the emic level of events of communication.

Third, this classification takes account only of part of the pragmatic aspect - the number of participants and the fact that they should be in certain relations to one another. But to understand their (the participants') behaviour in a given event of communication, we have to

specify these relations. This specification should take into account both intracommunicative (those that determined by the aims of the participants of this very event of communication) and extracommunicative (determined by the social structures in which the event of communication occurs) features.

But the attitudes of the participants, relation of the event to the activity it is involved in, and relations to other events are not considered. These aspects are made evident when we oppose events belonging to the same type. The result may be termed categories of communication.

2.4. Categories of events

The categories reflect the three sign aspects of events of communication and have from one to several values /meanings.

Categories reflecting relations of the participants to the event they are involved in. The participants may agree to be involved into the event or at least one of them does not like the fact. This opposition reveals the category of consent in its two values - positive (consent) and negative (refusal).

In case of positive value of consent the event proceeds more or less smoothly:

"This is a comfortable cafe," he said. "Did you have a good night, Jack?"
"I slept like a dog".
"I didn't sleep very well. Bill and I were out late, too".
"Where were you?"
"Here. And after it shut we went out to that other cafe. The old man there speaks German and English".

<div align="center">(Hemingway, 1981: 95)</div>

It does not mean though that the participant co-operate in organising activity (see analysis of different strategies of extracting information in Sorokina 1994).

In case of the negative value of consent one (at least) of the participants withdraws from the event either by silence or bluntly stating the refusal:

"Was Irwin ever broke?" I demanded.
He seemed about to say something, his lips opening. Then they closed.
"Was he?" I demanded.
"I will not touch the world of foulness again", he said, ... That was all I got.

<div align="center">(Warren, 1979: 192)</div>

The other type of relation is relation of representation. It means that the participants may speak for themselves (represent themselves). It may be termed direct representation. All the events cited above were of this value. They may speak on the behalf of somebody else (represent their trustees) . It may be termed indirect representation.

"I did not know he would take the remark I had prepared: "I've come to see you on behalf of your wife". (Maugham, 1960: 56).

Another aspect of relationship of the participants to the event of communication is distribution of authority. Events may be authoritative, that is they may have a definite leader who governs the event and the activity in which the event is involved.
"Go to the aim and fetch me..." the officer gave his commands. "Quick!" he added. ...the orderly turned in mechanical obedience, and set off... .
(Lawrence, 1977: 95)

On the other hand events of communication may have no definite leader, when both (or all) parties have (or pretend to have) equal authority in the activity and, consequently, in the event of communication:

"There'll be a town around it, and think what this land will be worth then!"
"Don't count your chickens," said Maggie.
(Lessing, 1977: 165)

Categories of participants' relationships. An important feature of event of communication is relationship and attitude of the participants to one another. This feature includes rank (status), ritual and etiquette.

Rank (status) indicates relative social position of the participants. An event may involve people of equal social status.

"I've got to be something," said Tommy angrily.
"They're going to make me be something".
"They wouldn't have to make me be anything," said Dirk, sardonically. "I know what I'd be".
"What?" asked Tommy enviously.
"An engineer".
"How do you know you've got to do?"
"That's what I want," said Dirk, stubbornly.
(Lessing, 1977: 220)

But the ranks (status) of the communicants can be different and then we find ranked events.

"Jim," said I, "where are you off to this trip? Is it elephants?"
"No, Baas," he answered, "we are after something worth much more than ivory".
"And what might that be?" I said, ... "Is it gold?"
"No, Baas, something worth more than gold," and he grinned.
"I asked no more questions, for I did not like to lower my dignity by seeming inquisitive...
"Baas," said he.
"Eh, boy, what is it?" answered I.
(Haggard, 1972: 41)

This dialogue needs some comments. It shows that authority (the category of the previous set) and a higher rank are different properties.

The authority is the feature of the event itself (in the dialogue the authority is Jim's and he shows it), while his rank of a South African native in the late 90ies of the XIX-th century is very low, and Jim's partner shows it. This dialogue demonstrates also that the Principle of Co-operation is only one of possible strategies envisaged by the Principle of Pragmatic

Sufficiency. The dialogue also gives evidence that the same is true for the Principle of Politeness.

The other two properties (ritual and etiquette) concern organising speech behaviour within the event itself.

Ritual organises the flow of the event itself, it is responsible for forms of initiating, proceeding and ending the event, ways of taking turns and successions of speech acts at certain stages of the event. The ritual can be strict (as in the passage from Haggart above), or loose as in the majority of other dialogues cited before.

Etiquette is responsible for creating favourable interpersonal attitude within the event and defines the forms of address, comments on partners' verbal and non-verbal behaviour etc.
The etiquette may be formal, and then the forms used are socially accepted and predictable.

"Very well, thank you, sir".
"I'm at Green Street. I stayed up about a young man ...
"Come in here, sir," said Michael, entering a small room.
<div align="center">(Galsworthy, 1953: 181)</div>

On the other hand the forms of etiquette can be invented in the event itself, thus such forms can be termed informal and they are not predictable and the partners have to guess what action in the partner's behaviour should be qualified as etiquette forms, which is not always easy

"... I've always remembered Doe in me prayers. Please stop smirking!" she demanded, stabbing out a cigarette. "I do say my prayers".
"I'm not smirking. I'm smiling. You're the most amazing person".
"I suppose I am," she said.
<div align="center">(Capote, 1974: 163)</div>

A rather detailed analysis of ritual and etiquette can be found in (Makarov, 1996).

Categories of relations to the activity the event is used in: The third aspect concerns relations of the event of communication and the activity it is involved in.

The first property here is relation to the result of the event itself. Events may be designed so that they must end with some conclusion, result, even if the result is stating the fact that the event was a failure. Such events can be termed resultative

"They walked along from the station together.
'I say, I want you to come and see another play with me', he said.
'I don't mind', she said.
'You might go so far as to say you'd like to".
'Why?'
'It doesn't matter. Let's fix a day. Would Saturday night suit you?'
'Yes. That'll do'.
They made further arrangements, ... ".
<div align="center">(Maugham, 1978: 282)</div>

Other events are designed and constructed so that they do not envisage any resultative stage.

This distinction is very well known in English as the difference between business (resultative) and small (unresultative) talk. (if clear and vague aims in Dialogue and Cognition, 1984). In fact the small talk has its own aim and result - arranging favourable preconditions for further activity. The actual difference is that "business" talk has overt result, while the small talk has covert aims and results.

The second property is determined by the stage of activity in which the events is used.

Activity is of circular structure including informative, solution, programming and correction stages (Leontyev 83: 143).

Since at each stage different problems are solved and as a result events of communication have different aims that cause them to have different structures. It is possible to differentiate the following kinds of events for different stages of activity information:

'... he told Emily about the sign he had seen advertising the Whiteheaven Cab and General Posting Company.'
'I was thinking of asking them if they wanted a driver.'
'What for?'
'What do you mean, woman? Because I want a change – that's 'whatever for'!'
<div align="right">(Bragg, 1979: 155)</div>

solving:

'We'll try her with a rope,' I said.
'I don't think its any use. You can't get a straight pull.' (Hemingway, 1976: 185)

programming:

'It was Reich who said: "Could we atomise it?"'
For a moment we failed to understand him ... Then, as we saw what he meant, we knew it was the only hope.
<div align="center">(Wilson, 1986: 172)</div>

and correcting:

'Reporting, sir,' said Carr. 'We are ready for landing.'
'Fine, Captain. Fine... We shall not be ready for some time, captain,' Decher said. 'The robots have just started their uncrating.'
'Very well,' said Carr. 'We await your orders, sir.'
'Thank you, Captain,' Decker told him.
<div align="center">(Simak, 1979: 183 - 184)</div>

Since for successful co-operation people have to co-ordinate both their actions and their motives events of communication can have the property of being directed either to co-ordination of actions — algorithmic events — as is illustrated by the dialogues in the above

passage, or to co-ordination of interests and motivation — motivation events — as is illustrated by the following dialogue:

'Now, now,' she smiled, 'you just said that I was a nice girl.'
'You're one of nicest girls I ever met,' said Paul soberly. 'Really you are. I often wonder...'
'You often wonder what?'
'What's going to become of you.'
'She felt like a river trying to run two ways at once; she felt herself shrinking from him, yet she flowed towards him too...
<p style="text-align:center">(Baldwin, 1977: 90)</p>

The features tentatively described above determine the illocutionary (and to a great degree propositional) structure of events, producing a model of an event of communication acting as an emic unit of this level of language.

For example the following dialogue can be described with the help of the features discussed above.

1. "Dr Gibbs: Oh, George, can you come down a minute?
2. George: Yes, Pa.
(He descends the ladder).
3. Dr Gibbs: Make yourself comfortable, George; I'll only keep you a minute. George, how old are you?
4. George: I? I'm sixteen, almost seventeen.
5. Dr Gibbs: What do you want to do after school's over?
6. George: Why, you know, Pa. I want to be a farmer on Uncle Luke's farm.
7. Dr Gibbs: You'll be willing, will you, to get up early and milk and feed the stock... and you'll be able to hoe and hay all day?
8. George: Sure, I will. What are you... what do you mean, Pa?
9. Dr Gibbs: Well, George, while I was in my office today I heard a funny sound ... and what do you think it was? It was your mother chopping wood. There you see your mother - getting up early; cooking meals all day long; washing and ironing, and still she has to go out in the back yard and chop wood. I suppose she just got tired of asking you. She just gave up and decided it was easier to do it herself. And you eat her meals, and put on the clothes she keeps nice for you, and you run off and play baseball - like she's some hired girl we keep around the house but that we don't like very much. Well, I knew all I had to do was to call your attention to it. Here's a handkerchief, son. George, I've decided to raise your spending money twenty-five cents a week. Not, of course, for chopping wood for your mother, because that's a present you give her, but because you're getting older - and I imaging there are lots of things you must find to do with it.
10. George: Thanks, Pa.
11. Dr Gibbs: Let's see - tomorrow's your pay day. You can count on it - Hmm. Probably Rebecca'll feel she ought to have some more too. Wonder what could have happened to your mother. Choir practice never was as late as this before.
12. George: It's only half past eight, Pa.
13. Dr Gibbs: I don't know why she's in that old choir. She hasn't any more voice than an old crow. ...Traipsin' around the street at this hour of the night. ... Just about time you retired, don't you think?

14. George: Yes, Pa.
　　　　(George mounts to his place on the ladder)". (Wilder, 1981: 30-31).

This passage is an example of a complete verbal contact and includes two event. The first event embraces the whole passage, while the second is shorter and is an insertion into the former:

11. "Dr Gibbs: ... Wonder what could have happened to your mother. Choir practice never was as late as this before.
12. George: It's only half past eight, Pa.
13. Dr Gibbs: I don't know why she's in that old choir. She hasn't any more voice than an old crow. ...Traipsin' around the streets at this hour of the night..."

Both the events possess several common futures. Both belong to the closed (private) type. The fact is stressed by the first utterance of Dr. Gibbs' as well as by his second introductory reply: "3. Dr Gibbs: Make yourself comfortable, George; I'll only keep you a minute. George, how old are you?". The type of communication remains the same in the inserted event. Both the events had the positive form of consent, because none of the participants demonstrates any intention to quit the event or change its features. The structure of the event displays formal etiquette and strict ritual. The event has partners of unequal rank and the participant of the lower rank (the son) has to answer direct questions and cannot show any communicative initiative. "Now you listen to me and do as you're told. You sit there in the corner by the fire; and when the company comes don't dare to speak until you're spoken to. ... ... let me have no chattering and making free with them, as if you were their equal." (Shaw, 1977: 54)). We find this in George's utterances, who has to answer his father's questions but cannot see the point in giving information that is well-known (utterances "4. George: I? I'm sixteen, almost seventeen."; "6. George: Why, you know, Pa. I want to be a farmer on Uncle Luke's farm." and "8. George: Sure, I will. What are you... what do you mean, Pa?"). Of special interest is utterance "12. George: It's only half past eight, Pa.' which is in fact an oblique directive. The speech act has the form of information (exact time is mentioned), which here means: "Don't worry". Dr Gibbs reaction is to ignore the utterance ("I took no notice" in a dialogue from Haggard above). Both events display direct representation.

Yet the events differ in the respect of relation to the activity. The larger event is programming, algorithmic and resultative, which is evident from the final sentences of Dr Gibbs' ninth remark: "9 ... Well, I knew all I had to do was to call your attention to it. Here's a handkerchief, son. George, I've decided to raise your spending money twenty-five cents a week. Not, of course, for chopping wood for your mother, because that's a present you give her, but because you're getting older - and I imaging there are lots of things you must find to do with it." The smaller event is informative, unresultative and neither motivating, not algorithmic.

3. COMMUNICATION PARTS

The involvement of texts and dialogues in the sphere of linguistic research not only expanded the number of units subjected to syntactic analysis but also makes it necessary to include new types of meanings related to the description of utterances functioning as units of

communication in the semantics of syntactic units. One of these comparatively new types of meanings that is being widely researched at present is the speaker's communicative intention, the illocutionary component of an utterance. Introduced by Speech Act Theory this new semantic parameter of the utterance went the way of all other semantic units: it followed the rule of semantic asymmetry: one and the same form is used to convey different communicative intention, one and the some intention finds its expression in different forms (Bogdanov, 1988). This fact has been registered in literature on general theory of communication (Bogdanov, 1988).

However, illocutionary ambiguity is resolved for each particular speech act. In this approach the illocutionary meaning of the utterance is defined in two stages. Firstly, one is to define logical incompatibility of the explicitly expressed indention of the utterance with the state of interlocutors at the time of producing he utterance. Secondly, having analysed the speaker's possible goals, one ascertains the true illocutionary meaning of the utterance (Allen, Perro 1988). To lift intentional ambiguity in each case one is to put each utterance in a broad extralinguistic context, which presupposes the use of conventions, postulates and strategic of communication (Demyankov, 1982). It should be noted that the putting of every utterance in a broad extralinguistic context makes research rather cumbersome. However this type of analysis though it may in principle lift illocutionary ambiguity cannot be totally satisfactory for the following reasons. Firstly, such general categories as conventions, postulates and strategies must not (by their extralinguistic definition) define isolated utterances but chains of related utterances. Secondly, this analysis is based on the hidden assumption that dialogue is constituted by individual utterances, that it is they that are immediate constituents of a dialogue. However, this assumption requires proof as in this case dialogue is perceived as constituted by a discrete multitude of separate actions. If an utterance is an 1C of a dialogue, then the speaker's strategies should be completely reviewed after each following utterance of the partner. Hence, it may seem that each time the dialogue starts from scratch depending on the relations between the speakers at each point in communication. However, samples of authentic dialogues, as a rule, include more than one pair of utterances. Moreover, here is real evidence the ICs of a dialogue are chains of utterances of each speaker. The following fragment of communication may serve as an example.

"He (Gulliman) ... felt a slight shock of finding it there ... Two first-degree murders ... He punched the knob of the two-way intercom ...
(1) 'Ali', said Gulliman. 'There are two first-degree murders this day. Is there any unusual problem?'
(2) 'No, sir.' the dark-complexioned face with its sharp, black eyes seemed restless. 'Both cases are quite low probability.'
(3) 'I know that', said Gulliman. 'I observed that neither probability is higher than 15 per cent. Just the same, Multivac has a reputation to maintain. It has virtually wiped out crime, and the public judges that by its record on first-degree murder which is, of course, the most spectacular crime!'
(4) Ali Othman nodded. 'Yes, sir. I quite realise that!'
(5) 'You also realise, I hope', Gulliman said, 'that I don't want a single consummated case of it during my term. If any other crime slips through, I may allow excuses. If a first-degree murder slips through, I'll have your hide. Understand?
(6) 'Yes, sir. The complete analyses of the two potential murders are already at the district offices involved. The potential criminals and victims are under observation. I have rechecked the probability of consummation and they are already dropping!'

(7) 'Very good!' , said Gulliman, and broke connection. He went back to the list with an uneasy feeling that perhaps he had been overpompous. - But then one had to be firm with these permanent civil-service personnel. (Asimov 1972: 153)

This fragment is an example of public communication, hence the positions of each speakers are clearly defined. As for the goal, the leading speaker wants to achieve, this fragment is a warning. Seven utterances making up this dialogue can be broken into pairs which constitute a chain of interactions (1 and 2, 2 and 3, etc.). However, if we pursue this line of analysis, he last remark (7) is left out of consideration and secondly it is not made clear why the speakers exchange information that is known to both of them. But if we regard this fragment as a whole and correlate it with the common goal ("But then one had to be firm ...") and analyse chains of utterances of each speaker, then information redundancy becomes justified.

Gulliman's aim is to put pressure on the divisions which are dependent on him. Othman's aim is to convince the authorities that everything is being done as it should be and that he takes heed of his boss's concern. These roles in communication determine the speakers' behaviour in this event of communication. Gulliman must find out whether his subordinate possesses enough information ((1) 'Ali. ... There are two first-degree murders this day. Is there any unusual problem?'), give additional information ((3) 'I know that. I observed that neither probability is higher than 15 per cent. Just the same, Multivac has a reputation to maintain. It has virtually wiped out crime, and the public judges that by its record on first-degree murder which is, of course, the most spectacular crime!') and point out possible consequences if the requirements are not fulfilled ((5) 'You also realise, I hope, that I don't want a single consummated case of it during my term. If any other crime slips through, I may allow excuses. If a first-degree murder slips through, I'll have your hide. Understand?'), and finally, set up or confirm a course of actions for the division he is in charge of ((7) 'Very good!'). This sequence of speech acts is expected of Gulliman. He is performing his role punctually, only in 5 his warning gets close to a threat and he is aware of it (... he had been overpompous)

Othman's behaviour in this event of communication is also built according to a predictable scheme - to inform that he possesses enough data to adequately react to the situation ((2) 'No, sir. Both cases are quite low probability.'), that he realises the importance of the information given ((4) 'Yes, sir. I quite realise that!') , that certain measures have been taken or are being taken in order to rectify the situation ((6) 'Yes, sir. The complete analyses of the two potential murders are already at the district offices involved. The potential criminals and victims are under observation. I have rechecked the probability of consummation and they are already dropping!'). The essential part here is that Gulliman's remarks and those of Othman presuppose each other. As a result of it, the expression of illocutionary component in the syntactic structure of these utterances becomes not only redundant but unnecessary (cf. Gulliman's assessment of illocution expressed in 5).
In any case as is seen from this dialogue propositional (information) constituents components become meaningful when the whole chain of utterances of a given speaker is considered.

The essential point here is that communicative roles can put some restrictions on the use of direct forms of expression of the illocutionary components of the utterance. Thus, for most communicative roles in most types of communication overt directives are not permissible while for the role of an officer overt directives are officially recognised as the most appropriate.

However, if for different roles there are certain restrictions on expressing illocutionary meanings, but communication requires the use of "forbidden" speech acts, there must be officially recognised forms of by-passing these restrictions, which will create the linguistic expression of the role. This means that these roles are part of the language system like other global semantic categories which should have special linguistic forms of their expression.

It is obvious that these roles can't be as specified and detailed as the roles of the teacher, doctor, shop assistant, engineer, student, patient and etc., as a set of such roles changes swiftly to reflect the changes of social activities in society. To have stable forms to express communicative intentions, communicative roles must themselves be relatively stable. This means that they must be defined on the basis of possible relations in the generalised model of communicator.

Relations defining generalised roles are fairly well known. They are:
a)relations of rank or status (elders, younger, equal);
b) the degree of interest of the speakers to achieve the goal of communication;
c) control over the actions to achieve which this act of communication is performed.

Conjunction of different values of the relations listed above as well as types of communication and the number of participants can provide us with a rather limited set of communicative roles, each having its own spectre of possible forms of expression of illocutionary meaning.

Thus, convention of communication is nothing more than a set of forms of expression of communicative intentions valid for the whole set of communicative roles.

4. MATRIX OF A PARTICIPANT

The description of events and communicative parts given above presupposes that the illocutionary components of speech acts are determined by the properties of larger units - event of communication and communicative part. It means that both illocutionary and propositional components of a speech act depend upon the purpose of the event, and the aims of the participants.

The types of events and their features determine the surface structure of the communicative part and the speech acts in them while the illocutionary meanings whether worded or conveyed through implicatures are determined by the aims of the participant.

The need for communication is caused by the necessity of assistance. It appears when a human being either cannot or does not want to do some actions himself. Thus his aim is to influence his partners so that the latter could assist him. On the other hand the partners also have their own aims and they also influence all the other participants. This interaction can be represented as attempts to modify different parameters of the participants relevant for the activity they are involved in.

These should be such features which make co-operation possible and necessary. They nclude:

a) information about the activity and action composing it;

b) relation to participant in the activity (whether it is needed or not);

c) authority to act;

d) attitude to the activity and its result;

e)attitude to other participant.

These features may be treated as parameters because they can be altered in the course of the event of communication. the aim of an event is to make the values of these parameters most favourable for successful development of activity. Thus each speech act can be viewed upon as an attempt to alter the values of the parameters of the participants in the required direction. This can be done if the participants have "images" of each other, i.e. a set of value of the above parameters, which each of the participants believe others to have. This "image" with the help of two more stable, unchangeable in the course of the event, properties provides the participants with ability to predict possible communicative actions of the partners and choose their own strategy.

The stable features that facilitate the participants to select the manner of their verbal behaviour reflect their rank and their relation to the initiative in the event. The latter means that a participant may be either the initiator of the even (the position: "I want X") or the addressee (the position: "My partner want X from me").

Obviously this paper is far from being exhaustive in presenting all the factors that determine the structure of the pragmatic component of language but even the few we have explored suggest that structural approach to this sphere can yield important results.

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