THE *SUNDESMOS* IN ANCIENT GREEK GRAMMAR: GRAMMATICAL STATUS AND SUBTYPES

Pierre Swiggers & Alfons Wouters

KU Leuven - FWO

Abstract: The term σύνδεσμος in ancient grammar covers a range of invariable words; the definition of the σύνδεσμος combines formal, semantic and even pragmatic criteria. In this article the evaluation of the definitions of the σύνδεσμος as they are found in ancient Greek philosophical and grammatical texts is examined, in order to trace the background of the definitions and the subdivisions, and in order to determine the set of criteria used to circumscribe the notion. The corpus examined is constituted by both the "technographical" literature on grammar and the linguistic remarks made by philosophers and rhetoricians.

The theory of parts of speech, which is still at the center of morphosyntactic description, has a long history, reaching back to Greek Antiquity. Its origins lie in Plato's and Aristotle's reflections on the constituent parts of discourse, which through a gradual refinement — in which the Stoic contribution stands out as prominent — led to the positing of eight μέρη τοῦ λόγου (see Robins 1986):

(a) the noun

(b) the verb

(c) the participle

(d) the article

(e) the pronoun

(f) the preposition

The first explicit statement of this division, enriched with short definitions, is attributed to Dionysius Thrax' *Tékhne grammatikḗ* (cf. Uhlig, *G.G.* I 1 / Lallot 1989 / Swiggers Wouters 1998 / Seldeslachts - Swiggers - Wouters 1998):

Τοῦ δὲ λόγου μέρη ἐcτὶν ὀκτώ· ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, μετοχή, ἄρθρον, ἀντωνυμία, πρόθεcιc, ἐπίρρημα, cύνδεcμοc. ἡ γὰρ προcηγορία ὡc εἶδοc τῷ ὀνόματι ὑποβέβληται (*G.G.* I 1, § 11).

'The parts of speech are eight [in number]: noun, verb, participle, article, pronoun, preposition, adverb, conjunction. For the appellative is subsumed under the noun, as [one of its] species.'

Each of these parts of speech is then dealt with separately, in paragraphs which offer a short definition, a subdivision into formal and/or semantic subclasses, and an account of a series of characteristics, — all this being illustrated with grammatical forms taken in isolation. The definitions given of each part of speech capture the essential formal and semantic properties:

(a) Ὄνομά ἐcτι μέροc λόγου πτωτικόν, cῶμα ἢ πρᾶγμα cημαῖνον, cῶμα μὲν οἷον λίθοc, πρᾶγμα δὲ οἷον παιδεία, κοινῶc τε καὶ ἰδίωc λεγόμενον, κοινῶc μὲν οἷον ἄνθρωποc ἵπποc, ἰδίωc δὲ οἷον Cωκράτηc. Παρέπεται δὲ τῷ ὀνόματι πέντε· γένη, εἴδη, cχήματα, ἀριθμοί, πτώcειc (§ 12).

'A noun is a part of speech, with case-inflection, signifying a (concrete) substance or a(n abstract) thing — a (concrete) substance like "stone", a(n abstract) thing like "education" —, taken in a common or particular sense — in a common sense, e.g., "man", "horse", in a particular sense, e.g., "Socrates". — There are five accidences of the noun: genders, species, figures, numbers, cases.'

(b) Ῥῆμά ἐcτι λέξιc ἄπτωτοc, ἐπιδεκτικὴ χρόνων τε καὶ προcώπων καὶ ἀριθμῶν, ἐνέργειαν ἢ πάθοc παριcτᾶcα. Παρέπεται δὲ τῷ ῥήματι ὀκτώ, ἐγκλίcειc, διαθέcειc, εἴδη, cχήματα, ἀριθμοί, πρόcωπα, χρόνοι, cυζυγίαι (§ 13).

'A verb is a word without cases, accepting tenses, persons, and numbers, and signifying an activity or an undergoing. There are eight accidences of the verb: moods, diatheses, species, figures, numbers, persons, tenses, conjugation classes.'

(c) Μετοχή ἐcτι λέξιc μετέχουcα τῆc τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ τῆc τῶν ὀνομάτων ἰδιότητοc. Παρέπεται δὲ αὐτῇ ταὐτὰ ἃ καὶ τῷ ὀνόματι καὶ τῷ ῥήματι δίχα προcώπων τε καὶ ἐγκλίcεων (§ 15).

'A participle is a word sharing the characteristics of both the verbs and the nouns. It has the same accidences as the noun and the verb, except for persons and moods.'

(d) Ἄρθρον ἐcτὶ μέροc λόγου πτωτικόν, προταccόμενον καὶ ὑποταccόμενον τῆc κλίcεωc τῶν ὀνομάτων. καὶ ἔcτι προτακτικὸν μὲν ὁ, ὑποτακτικὸν δὲ ὅc. Παρέπεται δὲ αὐτῷ τρία· γένη, ἀριθμοί, πτώcειc (§ 16).

'An article is a part of speech with case-inflections, which precedes or follows the inflection of the nouns. There is the prepositive *ho* ['the'], and the postpositive *hós* ['that, which']. It has three accidences: genders, numbers, cases.'

(e) Ἀντωνυμία ἐστὶ λέξις ἀντὶ ὀνόματος παραλαμβανομένη, προσώπων ὡρισμένων δηλωτική. Παρέπεται δὲ τῇ ἀντωνυμίᾳ ἕξ· πρόσωπα, γένη, ἀριθμοί, πτώσεις, σχήματα, εἴδη (§ 17).

'A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun, and indicating definite persons. The pronoun has six accidences: persons, genders, numbers, cases, figures, species.'

(f) Πρόθεσίς ἐστι λέξις προτιθεμένη πάντων τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν ἔν τε συνθέσει καὶ συντάξει (§ 18).

'A preposition is a word which is placed before all the parts of speech, in compounding and in construction.'

(g) Ἐπίρρημά ἐστι μέρος λόγου ἄκλιτον, κατὰ ῥήματος λεγόμενον ἢ ἐπιλεγόμενον ῥήματι. Τῶν δὲ ἐπιρρημάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἁπλᾶ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα· ἁπλᾶ μὲν ὡς πάλαι, σύνθετα δὲ ὡς πρόπαλαι (§ 19).

'An adverb is an uninflected part of speech, used with respect to a verb or added to a verb. Of the adverbs some are simple, others are compound; simple, like *pálai* ['long ago'], compound, like *própalai* ['very long ago'].'

(h) Σύνδεσμός ἐστι λέξις συνδέουσα διάνοιαν μετὰ τάξεως καὶ τὸ τῆς ἑρμηνείας κεχηνὸς δηλοῦσα. Τῶν δὲ συνδέσμων οἱ μέν εἰσι συμπλεκτικοί, οἱ δὲ διαζευκτικοί, οἱ δὲ συναπτικοί, οἱ δὲ παρασυναπτικοί, οἱ δὲ αἰτιολογικοί, οἱ δὲ ἀπορρηματικοί, οἱ δὲ συλλογιστικοί, οἱ δὲ παραπληρωματικοί (§ 20).

'A conjunction is a word linking together the thought, with order, and showing the void of the expression. Of the conjunctions some are copulative, others disjunctive, others synaptic, others parasynaptic, others causal, others dubitative, others syllogistic, others expletive.'

The system of parts of speech became the cornerstone of Western grammar; it was transmitted, through the Middle Ages (see Swiggers 1995) to the modern period, and its success must certainly be explained by its powerful (and flexible) correlation of linguistic forms, on the one hand, and thought-contents, on the other (see Swiggers 1997: 19-20). Grammar thus provided an essential link between categories of linguistic form and categories of thought.

A striking fact within the grammatical system is the focus on "paradigmatic" properties of word classes, the formal characteristics of which are coupled with semantic features, all of which concern the class as a whole or large subsets within the class. This testifies to an approach of a grammar which favours the study of elements in isolation, and which focuses on the presence or absence of inflection. This is the more striking, however, since the superordinate notion, viz. that of λόγος, as well as the definition of what could be translated as "linguistic form", viz. λέξις, highlight the aspect of arrangement, of combination into a larger unit:

Λέξιc ἐcτὶ μέροc ἐλάχιcτον τοῦ κατὰ cύνταξιν λόγου.
Λόγοc δέ ἐcτι πεζῆc λέξεωc cύνθεcιc διάνοιαν αὐτοτελῆ δηλοῦcα (*G.G.* I 1, § 12).
'The word is the smallest part of the constructed sentence.
The sentence is a combination of words (in prose?) which expresses a completed thought.'

The tension between the overall definition of discourse in terms of arrangement, on the one hand, and the focus on the class-specific properties in the definition of parts of speech, on the other hand, seems to be reflected in the treatment of declinable vs. indeclinable parts of speech: whereas the former are primarily seen as paradigmatic categories, the indeclinable parts of speech are partly defined in terms of their syntagmatic behaviour. Taking into account this fact, one can look for the presence of syntactic observations in the description of these parts of speech. The most interesting part of speech in this respect is the conjunction, and in this article we propose to examine the treatment of this part of speech in ancient Greek grammatical theory[1]. As we will try to show, morphological and semantic properties are coupled with or even subordinated to syntactic properties in the description and classification of conjunctions.

Our modern English term "conjunction" is based on the Latin semantic calque[2] for Greek σύνδεσμος, a term which refers to the role or function of constructing a discourse. The general semantic load of the term σύνδεσμος explains why the term was used, initially, as a cover-term for (various types of) words showing "binding-properties". Just like the term ἄρθρον, the term σύνδεσμος seems to have been borrowed from anatomical

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[1] For the theories of the Latin grammarians on the conjunction, see Gutiérrez Galindo (1989, 1990).

[2] Latin *coniunctio* is one of the attested loan-translations of the Greek term σύνδεσμος, next to *convinctio*. Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.*, I 4, 28.
In Greek and Latin the term σύνδεσμος or *coniunctio* belongs to a small set of grammatical terms, such as:

σύνδεσιс	connexio (colligatio)
συνδεσμέω	-
συνδεσμικός	-
συνδετικός	coniunctivus

terminology, and its application to language categories testifies to the ancient view of language (or speech) as an organical build-up. The wide coverage of the term is clear from the use Aristotle makes of the term σύνδεσμος in his *Poetics* XX, 6[3]:

Σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστιν φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν πεφυκυῖα συντίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἣν μὴ ἁρμόττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τιθέναι καθ' ἑαυτήν, οἷον μέν ἤτοι δέ ἤ

φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκεν μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν (1456b38-1457a6).

‘A σύνδεσμος is (a) a non-significant sound which neither precludes, nor brings about, the production of a single significant sound that by nature is composed of several sounds [i.e. an utterance], and which it is not appropriate to place at the beginning of an utterance on its own, e.g., *mén, ḗtoi, dé,*

or

[it is] (b) a non-sginificant sound which by nature produces, as a result of [joining together] several sounds that are significant, a single significant sound [i.e. an utterance]’[4].

Aristotle's definition is rather vague, but his examples clearly show that he has in mind particles like μέν, δέ, and also prepositions; no examples of what in our modern terminology are precisely called "conjunctions" are given, but we can safely assume that these more "typical" conjunctions would also belong here. Aristotle's text brings out (a) the unmeaningful nature of the σύνδεσμος, and (b) its non-central role in the sentence: it is either some kind of "phrasal appendix", or a phrase-formative element (constituting what we could call a prepositional phrase). Both views are of course closely tied up with what Aristotle considers to be "significant" (cf. Gusmani [1992] for a study of "meaning" and "meaningfulness" in Aristotle), and with his view of the sentence as being primarily a matter of construing categorical terms.

The Stoics kept the notion of "linking/binding" (which results from an etymological analysis of the term σύνδεσμος, connected with συνδεῖν), but added the morphological feature of indeclinability. Their definition of the σύνδεσμος is as follows: "A conjunction is an indeclinable part of speech, which links together the parts of speech/discourse" (Diogenes Laertius 7, 58: Σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου ἄπτωτον, συνδοῦν τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου). Given the scarcity of information we have on the Stoic analysis of the indeclinable

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[3] We quote the edition of Kassel (1965).

[4] We follow here largely the translation of Janko (1987: 27). On this passage of the *Poetics*, see also Rosén (1990) and Swiggers - Wouters (forthcoming).

parts of speech, it is impossible to determine what exactly they included under the σύνδεσμος.

The first author to posit a class consisting of phrase- (and sentence-) conjoining elements, as distinguished from the prepositions, is Aristarchus (ca. 217-145 B.C.)[5], but we have to wait for the text of the *Tékhnē grammatikē*, attributed to Aristarchus' disciple Dionysius Thrax (ca. 170 - 90 B.C.), before we find a rather extensive treatment of the σύνδεσμος.

The text of the *Tékhnē*, from which we have quoted the definitions of the parts of speech, is important in several respects: first, because it defines all the parts of speech, so that the reader can judge the grammarian on the consistency of his theoretical and terminological apparatus; second, because it provides (ramified) subclassifications of the parts of speech; third, because it reflects the criteria on which the grammarians based themselves.

The interest of the chapter on the conjunction (§ 20 of the *Tékhnë*) is manifest in at least three respects: (1) it offers a useful and philosophically interesting definition of this part of speech; (2) it discusses and exemplifies the subclassification of conjunctions; (3) it points to a tradition of research.

We will first deal with the latter aspect. The chapter on the conjunction ends with a reference to a divergent classification of the conjunctions, in which at least one additional class is added to the inventory, viz. that of the adversative conjunctions (σύνδεσμοι ἐναντιωματικοί). The author of the *Tékhnē* did not consider it worthwhile to assign the status of subclass to this type of conjunctions, but he was aware of the opposite stand taken by other grammarians, and he deemed it useful to make at least mention of this type. In our view, the reason for this would be that the adversative conjunctions also display a "logical" function, and thus rejoin the types of conjunctions listed as subclasses: these are all, except for the last class of the "expletive" conjunctions, words which have a "logical" function. This brings us directly to the definition and subclassification of the σύνδεσμος in the *Tékhnē*. We have a short definition of the conjunction, which radically departs from the definitions of other parts of speech in the *Tékhnē*, since this is the only part which does not receive a formally based definition. As a matter of fact, the σύνδεσμος is defined with reference to what goes on the mind: it is a word "linking together the thought, with order, and showing the void of the expression." Contrary to Baratin (1989: 31), we feel that this definition is rather far away from the Stoic definition quoted above (as transmitted by

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[5] On Aristarchus' grammatical conceptions, see Ax (1991: 282-288).

Diogenes Laertius): in Dionysius' *Tékhnē*, the conjunction is merely identified in a first stage as a λέξις (and not as a μέρος τοῦ λόγου), and there is no reference to its invariability (or "indeclinable nature"). Dionysius' definition of the conjunction is particularly interesting because of its philosophical slant, since it is stated (a) that the conjunction links together the *thought* (in the Stoic definition the conjunction is said to conjoin the (other) parts of speech), and (b) that the conjunction "shows the void of the expression". The latter portion of the definition (τὸ τῆς ἑρμηνείας κεχηνὸς δηλοῦσα) has been the topic of discussions on the textual transmission[6]: some scholars prefer the reading πληροῦσα ("filling up") instead of δηλοῦσα ("showing"). This deviant reading has more arguments against it than in favour of it: (1) first, there is the fact that the fifth century Armenian translation of the *Tékhnē* also has a verb meaning "to show" (*yaytnē*)[7]; (2) secondly, the reading δηλοῦσα is the older one and also the *lectio difficilior* (it seems that πληροῦσα was proposed by the Byzantine philologist Moschopoulos (ca. 1300), possibly on account of the fact that the Alexandrine grammarian Tryphon (first cent. B.C.), at least according to Apollonius Dyscolus (2nd cent. A.D.)[8], spoke of "filling up" the void of expression); (3) and thirdly, it is possible to give a straightforward explanation for Dionysius' description of the conjunction as showing the void of the expression. As a preliminary to this explanation it is necessary to reflect on the definition of the conjunction in its full form. Conjunctions are said to be *linking-words*, not words expressing a διάνοια in themselves; this idea, and the occurrence of the term ἑρμηνεία invite us to establish a link between Dionysius' definition of the conjunction and Aristotle's theory of expression of thought into "lingual" shape (a paraphrase for the Greek noun ἑρμηνεία), as expounded in his *Peri Hermeneias*. It is clear from both the text of the *Peri Hermeneias* and that of the *Categories* that Aristotle's primary interest is in those grammatical classes which correspond to a lexical, or better a "representational" content. Hence the limitation of the linguistic discussion, below the level of the sentence, as we find it in the *Peri Hermeneias*, to two classes: ὄνομα (the examples given suggest that we should translate it here as "naming-word") and ῥῆμα (the verbal predicate). And in the *Categories* the ways things are said — or the ways in which "being" is spoken about — are all linked to linguistic expressions with a "real world-content" (cf. the examples given of substance, quantity, quality, relation/relatedness, place, time, position, possesion, action, undergoing)[9].

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[6] See Lallot (1989: 227-229) for a *status quaestionis*. Cf. also Calboli (1993: 33-36).

[7] Cf. Adontz (1970: 35).

[8] Cf. *G.G.* II 1, 247.22-26.

[9] *Categories* IV, 1b 25-2a 3: Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος· ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπηχυ, τρίπηχυ· ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν· πρός τι δὲ οἷον διπλάσιον, ἥμισυ, μεῖζον· ποῦ δὲ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, ἐν ἀγορᾷ· ποτὲ δὲ οἷον ἐχθές, πέρυσιν· κεῖσθαι δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται, κάθηται· ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται· ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνει, καίει·

It is in the light of an Aristotelian based view of language (or linguistic expression) that we have to read the definition of the conjunction in the *Tékhnē*. The primary function of words is to express our grasp of reality, and this is utterly clear in the case of "object-terms", "quality-terms", "action or event-terms". Conjunctions do not correspond to any object in reality nor to any state of affairs: their presence, in language, shows a "void" in linguistic symbolization (ἑρμηνεία), a void which is precisely due to the fact that there is nothing in reality wich corresponds to relations such as disjunction, conjunction, condition, consequence, implication, deduction, putting in doubt, etc. Conjunctions are therefore words which have no "real world-content", but they have an indicative function with reference to the underdetermination of thought by reality: thinking is not exhausted by "what there is". The "void" (κεχηνός) mentioned in the definition of the conjunction is thus "the gap" extending between the expression of real-world contents (objects/states of affairs) and logical thinking about this: and this void is precisely shown by the conjunction wich expresses the way in wich the mind establishes a relationship between (propositional) contents. Conjunctions are thus not words with real world-contents, but words which only have content *inside* discourse; their precise discursive content allows the grammarian to differentiate between subclasses of conjunctions.

This brings us to the issue of the classification of conjunctions in ancient Greek grammar, which is an extremely complex one. If one takes into account the scholiasts' commentaries *(Schol. Dion. Thr.)* on the *Tékhnē* and Apollonius Dyscolus' treatise *De coniunctione (G.G.* II 1, 211-258), we note that various subclasses of conjunctions were set up. Among the "species" mentioned there are, e.g., the συμπλεκτικοί, the διαζευκτικοί, the συλλογιστικοί, the παραπληρωματικοί, the συναπτικοί, the παρασυναπτικοί, the διστακτικοί ("expressive of doubt"), the αἰτιολογικοί, the ἐπιζευκτικοί (/ ὑποθετικοί[10]) ("suppositive" / "hypothetical"),. the ἐναντιωματικοί, etc[11]. The *Tékhnē* has only eight types: the copulative, the disjunctive, the synaptic, the parasynaptic, the causal, the dubitative, the syllogistic, and the expletive.

πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεται, καίεται. "Each uncombined word or expression means: what, how large, what kind of thing, related to what, where, when, in what position, in what state, what doing, what suffering. Examples, to be sketchy, of '*what*' are "man" and "horse", of '*how large*', "two cubits long", "three cubits long", of '*what kind of thing*', "white" and "grammatical", of '*related to what*', "double" and "half" and "greater", of '*where*', "in the Lyceum", "in the market-place", of '*when*', "yesterday", "last year", of '*in what position*', "is lying", "is sitting", of '*in what state*', "is shod", "is armed", of '*what doing*', "cuts", "burns", of '*what suffering*', "is cut", "is burnt".

[10] For the σύνδεσμοι ὑποθετικοί, mentioned in *P. Lit. Lond. 182* (= Wouters 1979, no. 2), cf. Schenkeveld (1982).

[11] For a full list, see Sancho Royo (1984).

Each of these types is defined and exemplified (in what seems to be an exhaustive way[12]):

⟨1⟩ Cυμπλεκτικοὶ μὲν οὖν εἰcιν ὅcοι τὴν ἑρμηνείαν ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἐκφερομένην cυνδέουcιν. εἰcὶ δὲ οἵδε· μέν δέ τέ καί ἀλλά ἡμέν ἠδέ ιδέ ἀτάρ αὐτάρ ἤτοι κέν ἄν.

⟨2⟩ Διαζευκτικοὶ δέ εἰcιν ὅcοι τὴν μὲν φράcιν ἐπιcυνδέουcιν, ἀπὸ δὲ πράγματος εἰc πρᾶγμα διιcτᾶcιν. εἰcὶ δὲ οἵδε· ἤ ἤτοι ἠέ.

⟨3⟩ Cυναπτικοὶ δέ εἰcιν ὅcοι ὕπαρξιν μὲν οὐ δηλοῦcι, cημαίνουcι δὲ ἀκολουθίαν. εἰcὶ δὲ οἵδε· εἰ εἴπερ εἰδή εἰδήπερ.

⟨4⟩ Παραcυναπτικοὶ δέ εἰcιν ὅcοι μεθ' ὑπάρξεωc καὶ τάξιν δηλοῦcιν. εἰcὶ δὲ οἵδε· ἐπεί ἐπείπερ ἐπειδή ἐπειδήπερ.

⟨5⟩ Αἰτιολογικοὶ δέ εἰcιν ὅcοι ἐπ' ἀποδόcει αἰτίαc ἕνεκεν παραλαμβάνονται. εἰcὶ δὲ οἵδε· ἵνα ὄφρα ὅπωc ἕνεκα οὕνεκα διὄ διὄτι καθ' ὅ καθ' ὅτι καθ' ὅcον.

⟨6⟩ Ἀπορ[ρ]ηματικοὶ δέ εἰcιν ὅcοι ἐπαποροῦντεc εἰώθαcι cυνδεῖν. εἰcὶ δὲ οἵδε· ἆρα κᾶτα μῶν.

⟨7⟩ Cυλλογιcτικοὶ δέ εἰcιν ὅcοι πρὸc τὰc ἐπιφοράc τε καὶ cυλλήψειc τῶν ἀποδείξεων εὖ διάκεινται. εἰcὶ δὲ οἵδε· ἆρα ἀλλά ἀλλαμήν τοίνυν τοιγάρτοι τοιγαροῦν.

⟨8⟩ Παραπληρωματικοὶ δέ εἰcιν ὅcοι μέτρου ἤ κόcμου ἕνεκεν παραλαμβάνονται. εἰcὶ δὲ οἵδε· δή ῥά νύ πού τοί θήν ἄρ δῆτα πέρ πώ μήν ἄν αὖ νῦν οὖν κέν γέ.
Τινὲc δὲ προcτιθέαcι καὶ ἐναντιωματικούc, οἷον ἔμπηc ὅμωc (G.G. I 1, 87-101).

'(1) Copulative, now, are those which link together the expression extended without any limit. They are the following: *mén* ['on the one hand'], *dé* ['but', 'and'], *té* ['and'], *kaí* ['and'], *allá* ['but'], *ēmén* ['both [... and]'], *ēdé* ['[both] ... and'], *idé* ['and'], *atár, autár* ['but'], *ḗtoi* ['or'], *kén, án.*

(2) Disjunctive are those which link together the wording, but [which] separate one thing from another. They are the following: *ḗ, ḗtoi, ēé* ['or'].

(3) Synaptic are those which do not express real occurrence, but [which] signify a consequence. They are the following: *eí* ['if'], *eíper, eidḗ, eidḗper* ['if really', 'if indeed'].

(4) Parasynaptic are those which show, together with real occurrence, also an order. They are the following: *epeí* ['since'], *epeíper* ['since indeed'], *epeidḗ* ['since'], *epeidḗper* ['since indeed'].

(5) Causal are those which are used for the indication of a reason. They are the following: *hína, óphra, hópōs* ['that', 'in order that'], *héneka, hoúneka* ['because'], *dihó* ['wherefore', 'on which account'], *dihóti* ['because', 'since'], *kath'hó* ['in so far as', 'according as'; 'wherefore'], *kath'hóti, kath'hóson* ['so far as', 'inasmuch as'].

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[12] However, frequent conjunctions such as ὥcτε or ὅτι are simply not listed.

(6) Dubitative are those with which speakers, in case of doubt, are accustomed to link together [the discourse]. They are the following: *âra, kâta* ['and then ...?', 'and so ...?'], *môn* ['surely not ...?'].

(7) Syllogistic are those which are well suited for the conclusions and the [second] premisses of proofs. They are the following: *ára* ['then'], *allá, allamén* ['now', 'then'], *toínun, toigártoi, toigaroûn* ['therefore'].

(8) Expletive are those which are used for [the need of] the metre or ornament. They are the following: *dé* ['now', 'then', 'in fact'], *rhá, nú* ['now'], *poû* ['perhaps'], *toí* ['mark you', 'look you'], *thén* ['in truth'], *ár, dêta* ['indeed'], *pér* ['very much'], *pó* ['at all'], *mén* ['verily', 'truly', 'surely'], *án, aû* ['again', 'anew'], *nûn* ['now'], *oûn* ['so', 'then'], *kén, gé* ['at least', 'at any rate'].

Some add also [what they call] adversative [conjunctions], e.g., *émpēs, hómōs* ['all the same', 'nevertheless']'.

We will now take a closer look at these various subtypes[13]. As can be seen, the expletive conjunctions do not have any discursive content at all: they are verse-fillers, and in this respect they hardly satisfy the definition of the conjunction when taken strictly ("a word linking together the thought"). The other conjunctional classes have to do with the modal scope of thought contents (e.g., the dubitative conjunctions), with the concatenation or separation of propositional contents (judgments/statements), as is the case of the copulative (*"and"*, *"but"*), disjunctive (*"or"*), syllogistic (*"then"*, *"therefore"*) and causal conjunctions (both "purposive" and "explanatory"), or with the construction of a complex statement, which is based on the *relation* between propositional components. The last case corresponds to the classes of synaptic and parasynaptic conjunctions, which call for a brief comment. Both terms (συναπτικοί, παρασυναπτικοί), like most of the other terms for types of conjunctions, have their origin in classifications already elaborated by the Stoics. But whereas the Stoics defined *axiốmata* ("propositions"), the *Tékhnē* defines the conjunctions which are used to build the respective *axiốmata*[14].

In the case of synaptic and parasynaptic conjunctions the Stoics had made a distinction between a conjoining of hypothetical propositions which merely expresses the relationship of consequence, and a conjoining of propositions which asserts the factuality of the introductory clause, so that the combination can be read as an inference. The Stoic view is summarized as follows by Diogenes Laertius (VII, 72): Τῶν δ' οὐχ ἁπλῶν ἀξιωμάτων συνημμένον μέν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν ταῖς Διαλεκτικαῖς φησι καὶ Διογένης

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[13] See also Sancho Royo (1984: 100-103) and Lallot (1989: 238-251).

[14] On the difference between the Stoic approach and Dionysius' approach, see Swiggers - Wouters (1994).

ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, τὸ συνεστὸς διὰ τοῦ "εἰ" συναπτικοῦ συνδέσμου. ἐπαγγέλλεται δ' ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι". παρασυνημμένον δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Κρῖνίς φησιν ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπὸ τοῦ "ἐπεί" συνδέσμου παρασυνῆπται ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀξιώματος καὶ λῆγον εἰς ἀξίωμα, οἷον "ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν". ἐπαγγέλλεται δ' ὁ σύνδεσμος ἀκολουθεῖν τε τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὑφεστάναι. 'Of propositions that are not simple the hypothetical, according to Chrysippus in his *Dialectics*, and Diogenes in *Art of Dialectic*, is one that is formed by means of the conditional conjunction "if". Now this conjunction announces that the second of two things follows consequentially upon the first, as, for instance, "If it is day, it is light". An inferential proposition according to Crinis in his *Art of Dialectic* is one which is introduced by the conjunction "since" and consists of an initial proposition and a conclusion; for example, "since it is day-time, it is light". This conjunction guarantees both that the second thing follows from the first and that the first is really a fact'. The *Tékhnē*, which may have introduced the term παρασυναπτικός, on the model of συναπτικός (only the latter term seems to have been used by the Stoics), basically retains the same semantic-ontological distinction, and adopts two essential notions already found in the Stoic doctrine, viz. ἀκολουθία and ὕπαρξις (cf. ὑφεστάναι in Diogenes Laertius' text). The term ἀκολουθία refers to the relationship of consequence/consequentiality: in a formal-logical account, we could define the notion as "entailment". The ὕπαρξις, which is specific to the parasynaptic conjunctions, refers to existential import: the introductory proposition is taken to be a fact, so that apart from the expression of mere consequentiality it is also affirmed that the consequence obtains in reality. This type of hypothetical linking corresponds to an inference ("given that p, then q"). The parasynaptic conjunctions thus come very close to causal (but not causal-final) relationships, although they are expressed by forms which are extensions of the synaptic conjunctions (cf. ἐπεί, ἐπείπερ, ἐπειδή, ἐπειδήπερ and the synaptic conjunctions εἴ, εἴπερ, εἰδή, εἰδήπερ).

It may also be the case that the author of the *Tékhnē* deliberately speaks of ἀκολουθία in the case of synaptic conjoining, and of τάξις in the case of parasynaptic conjoining (although one notes that most commentators consider both terms to be synonymous). If the terminological distinction was made deliberately, we should interpret ἀκολουθία as referring to the relation of consequence holding between B and A (A being the condition of B), irrespective of the occurrence of both in reality (ὕπαρξις); the term τάξις would then refer to the order of events (A precedes B), but perhaps more stricly to the linear order of the two propositions (the "grounding" sentence, from which the inference is drawn, preceding the conclusion; this is the standard order in Classical Greek for complex propositions introduced by εἴ, εἴπερ …).

What can be said in conclusion of this analysis of the chapter on the conjunction in the *Tékhnē grammatikē*? In spite of the fact that we can criticize it for leaving out some (frequent) conjunctions and for providing short and somewhat vague definitions, it should be recognized that the author made an attempt to account systematically for a word class which does not have lexical (-referential) content, and whose status cannot be defined in terms of dependency on an other word in the sentence. In this respect the conjunction proved to be the most difficult class to define within a word-based grammatical model; nonetheless, the *Tékhnē* not only succeeded in identifying a large number of conjunctions, but it also provided a logically based grid for a subclassification of this discourse-constructing class of words.

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